A Kripke model ? is a submodel of another Kripke model ℳ if ? is obtained by restricting the set of nodes of ℳ. In this paper we show that the class of formulas of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic that is preserved under taking submodels of Kripke models is precisely the class of semipositive formulas. This result is an analogue of the Łoś-Tarski theorem for the Classical Predicate Calculus.In Appendix A we prove that for theories with decidable identity we can take (...) as the embeddings between domains in Kripke models of the theory, the identical embeddings. This is a well known fact, but we know of no correct proof in the literature. In Appendix B we answer, negatively, a question posed by Sam Buss: whether there is a classical theory T, such that ℋT is HA. Here ℋT is the theory of all Kripke models ℳ such that the structures assigned to the nodes of ℳ all satisfy T in the sense of classical model theory. (shrink)

From the reviews: "A good textbook can improve a lecture course enormously, especially when the material of the lecture includes many technical details. Van Dalen's book, the success and popularity of which may be suspected from this steady interest in it, contains a thorough introduction to elementary classical logic in a relaxed way, suitable for mathematics students who just want to get to know logic. The presentation always points out the connections of logic to other parts of mathematics. The reader (...) immediately see the logic is "just another branch of mathematics" and not something more sacred." Acta Scientiarum Mathematicarum, Hungary. (shrink)

There are several ways for defining the notion submodel for Kripke models of intuitionistic first‐order logic. In our approach a Kripke model A is a submodel of a Kripke model B if they have the same frame and for each two corresponding worlds Aα and Bα of them, Aα is a subset of Bα and forcing of atomic formulas with parameters in the smaller one, in A and B, are the same. In this case, B is called an extension of (...) A. We characterize theories that are preserved under taking submodels and also those that are preserved under taking extensions as universal and existential theories, respectively. We also study the notion elementary submodel defined in the same style and give some results concerning this notion. In particular, we prove that the relation between each two corresponding worlds of finite Kripke models A ≤ B is elementary extension (in the classical sense) (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

Since in Heyting Arithmetic all atomic formulas are decidable, a Kripke model for HA may be regarded classically as a collection of classical structures for the language of arithmetic, partially ordered by the submodel relation. The obvious question is then: are these classical structures models of Peano Arithmetic ? And dually: if a collection of models of PA, partially ordered by the submodel relation, is regarded as a Kripke model, is it a model of HA? Some partial answers to these (...) questions were obtained in [6], [3], [1] and [2]. Here we present some results in the same direction, announced in [7]. In particular, it is proved that the classical structures at the nodes of a Kripke model of HA must be models of IΔ1 and that the relation between these classical structures must be that of a Δ1-elementary submodel. MSC: 03F30, 03F55. (shrink)

We define notions of homomorphism, submodel, and sandwich of Kripke models, and we define two syntactic operators analogous to universal and existential closure. Then we prove an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized (dual of the) Lyndon-Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under inverse images of homomorphisms of Kripke models, an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Łoś-Tarski Theorem, which characterizes the sentences preserved under submodels of Kripke models, and an intuitionistic analogue of the generalized Keisler Sandwich Theorem, which characterizes the (...) sentences preserved under sandwiches of Kripke models. We also define several intuitionistic formula hierarchies analogous to the classical formula hierarchies $\forall_n (= \Pi^0_n)$ and $\exists_n (=\Sigma^0_n)$ , and we show how our generalized syntactic preservation theorems specialize to these hierarchies. Each of these theorems implies the corresponding classical theorem in the case where the Kripke models force classical logic. (shrink)

We define two notions for intuitionistic predicate logic: that of a submodel of a Kripke model, and that of a universal sentence. We then prove a corresponding preservation theorem. If a Kripke model is viewed as a functor from a small category to the category of all classical models with morphisms between them, then we define a submodel of a Kripke model to be a restriction of the original Kripke model to a subcategory of its domain, where every node in (...) the subcategory is mapped to a classical submodel of the corresponding classical model in the range of the original Kripke model. We call a sentence universal if it is built inductively from atoms using ∧, ∨, ∀, and →, with the restriction that antecedents of → must be atomic. We prove that an intuitionistic theory is axiomatized by universal sentences if and only if it is preserved under Kripke submodels. We also prove the following analogue of a classical model-consistency theorem: The universal fragment of a theory Γ is contained in the universal fragment of a theory Δ if and only if every rooted Kripke model of Δ is strongly equivalent to a submodel of a rooted Kripke model of Γ. Our notions of Kripke submodel and universal sentence are natural in the sense that in the presence of the rule of excluded middle, they collapse to the classical notions of submodel and universal sentence. (shrink)

Let T be a first-order theory. A T-normal Kripke structure is one in which every world is a classical model of T. This paper gives a characterization of the intuitionistic theory T of sentences intuitionistically valid in all T-normal Kripke structures and proves the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. For Peano arithmetic , the theory PA is a proper subtheory of Heyting arithmetic , so HA is complete but not sound for PA-normal Kripke structures.

We study the relations of being substructure and elementary substructure between Kripke models of intuitionistic predicate logic with the same arbitrary frame. We prove analogues of Tarski's test and Löwenheim-Skolem's theorems as determined by our definitions. The relations between corresponding worlds of two Kripke models [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K] ⪯ [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL K]′ are studied.