Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy (...) of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support. (shrink)

We are happy to present to the reader the first book of our Applied Logic Series. Walton's book on the fallacies of ambiguity is firmly at the heart of practical reasoning, an important part of applied logic. There is an increasing interest in artifIcial intelligence, philosophy, psychol ogy, software engineering and linguistics, in the analysis and possible mechanisation of human practical reasoning. Continuing the ancient quest that began with Aristotle, computer scientists, logicians, philosophers and linguists are vigorously seeking to deepen (...) our understanding of human reasoning and argumentation. Significant communities of researchers are actively engaged in developing new approaches to logic and argumentation, which are better suited to the urgent needs of today's applications. The author of this book has, over many years, made significant contributions to the detailed analysis of practical reasoning case studies, thus providing solid foundations for new and more applicable formal logical systems. We welcome Doug Walton's new book to our series. (shrink)

Producers, traders, and consumers oforganic food regularly use the concept of thenatural (naturalness) to characterize organicagriculture and or organic food, in contrast tothe unnaturalness of conventional agriculture.Critics sometimes argue that such use lacks anyrational (scientific) basis and only refers tosentiment. In our project, we made an attemptto clarify the content and the use of theconcepts of nature and naturalness in organicagriculture, to relate this conception todiscussions within bioethical literature, andto draw the implications for agriculturalpractice and policy.Qualitative interviews were executed with (...) arange of people in the field of organicagriculture and with consumers of organicproducts, on the basis of a list of statementsabout the meaning of the concept of naturalnessformulated by the authors. Based on the resultsof the interviews, we distinguished 3 aspectsof the concept of naturalness: natural as theorganic (life processes), natural as theecological, and natural as referring to thecharacteristic nature of an entity. We relatedthese conceptual aspects to three mainapproaches within the field of organicagriculture: the no chemicals approach, theagro-ecological approach, and the integrityapproach. It became clear that these approachescan also be recognized in the change ofattitude of farmers as they convert fromconventional to organic agriculture, and in theattitudes of consumers of organic foodproducts. (shrink)

This article discusses the debate about vaccination as a case of public scientific technological controversy. In the vaccination controversy there is a scientific question, the effectiveness of vaccines in the elimination of diseases; a question of risk assessment, possible adverse effects and the possibility that immunization causes idiopathic diseases; an ethical question, the balance of rights between the two groups and the limits of the freedom of choice of treatment; and a political issue, who must take decisions about immunization and (...) whether immunization should be mandatory. The results of the analysis of the controversy suggest that the attitudes of the anti-vaccination groups towards vaccination are largely explained by their worldview which comes majorly from New Age beliefs. This worldview causes differences in the interpretation of evidence, law, risk and science. (shrink)

This paper argues for the following four claims: the terms “natural” and “unnatural” are ambiguous. Genetically modified food is unnatural in some senses of the term “unnatural”. Natural food should be favored over unnatural food in some senses of the terms “natural” and “unnatural”. Genetically modified food is not necessarily unnatural in a sense that would offer a good reason for favoring food that is not genetically modified. The claims are defended by distinguishing four different senses of the terms “natural” (...) and “unnatural”. Each sense is analyzed with respect to its moral relevance for food choice. (shrink)

Is food’s naturalness conceptually connected to its healthiness? Answering the question requires spelling out the following: (1) What is meant by the healthiness of food? (2) What different conceptual meanings the term natural has in the context of food? (3) Are some of those meanings connected to the healthiness of food? In this paper the healthiness of food is understood narrowly as food’s accordance with nutritional needs of its eater. The connection of healthiness to the following five food-related senses of (...) the term “natural’’ is analyzed: naturalness as nutritive suitability, naturalness as moderate need satisfaction, naturalness as lack of human influence, naturalness as authenticity, and naturalness as familiarity. It is concluded that some very common current uses of the term “natural,” such as naturalness as lack of human influence, are not conceptually connected to the healthiness of food. Nevertheless, the first two senses of naturalness are strongly conceptually connected to healthiness in the food context and the last one may be indirectly related to it. Thus, desire for natural food is not necessarily mistaken and misguided. (shrink)

Hamblin held that the conception of 'fallacy' as an argument that seems valid but is not really so was the dominant conception of fallacy in the history of fallacy studies. The present paper explores the extent of support that there is for this view. After presenting a brief analysis of 'the standard definition of fallacy,' a number of the definitions of 'fallacy' in texts from the middle of this century – from the standard treatment – are considered. This is followed (...) by a review of the definitions of 'fallacy' in the earlier history of logic books, including those of Aristotle, Whately, Mill and De Morgan. The essay concludes that there is scarcely any support for Hamblin's view that this particular definition of 'fallacy' was widely held. (shrink)

Environmentalists express concern at the destruction/exploitation of areas of the natural environment because they believe that those areas are of intrinsic value. An emerging response is to argue that natural areas may have their value restored by means of the techniques of environmental engineering. It is then claimed that the concern of environmentalists is irrational, merely emotional or even straightforwardly selfish. This essay argues that there is a dimension of value attaching to the natural environment which cannot be restored no (...) matter how technologically proficient environmental engineers become. The argument involves highlighting and discussing analogies between faking art and faking nature. The pivot of the argument is the claim that genesis is a significant determinant of an area's value. (shrink)

In one study funded by the United States Department of Agriculture, people from North Dakota were interviewed to discover which moral principles they use in evaluating the morality of transgenic organisms and their introduction into markets. It was found that although the moral codes the human subjects employed were very similar, their views on transgenics were vastly different. In this paper, the codes that were used by the respondents are developed, compared to that of the academically composed Belmont Report, and (...) then modified to create the more practical Common Moral Code. At the end, it is shown that the Common Moral Code has inherent inconsistency flaws that might be resolvable, but would require extensive work on the definition of terms and principles. However, the effort is worthwhile, especially if it results in a common moral code that all those involved in the debate are willing to use in negotiating a resolution to their differences. (shrink)

: The introduction of transgenic organisms into agriculture has raised a firestorm of controversy. Many view the technology as a pathway to a much better future society, whereas others condemn it for endangering people and the environment. One defective argument against transgenics is the Unnatural Is Unethical argument (UIU). UIU attempts to prove if transgenic organisms are unnatural and all unnatural things are morally bad, then transgenics are morally bad. However, the argument fails once it is shown that there is (...) no plausible definition for "unnatural." Therefore, UIU should be abandoned in favor of arguments more likely to succeed. (shrink)

This paper addresses four issues: 1. What is nonsense? 2. Is nonsense possible? 3. Is nonsense actual? 4. Why do the answers to (1)–(3) matter, if at all? These are my answers: 1. A sentence (or an utterance of one) is nonsense if it fails to have or express content (more on ‘express’, ‘have’, and ‘content’ below). This is a version of a view that can be found in Carnap (1959), Ayer (1936), and, maybe, the early Wittgenstein (1922). The notion (...) I propose abstracts away from their favored (but wrong) theories of what meaning is. It is a notion of nonsense that can be appealed to by all semantic frameworks and all theories of what content is, but structurally it is just like e.g. Carnap’s. Nonsense, as I construe it, is accompanied by illusions of thought (and I think that was part of Carnap’s conception as well). 2. Yes. In particular, I examine three arguments for the impossibility of illusion of thought (which on my construal accompanies linguistic nonsense) and they are all unsound. 3. Yes. There might be a lot of nonsense, both in ordinary and theoretical speech. In particular, it is likely that much of contemporary philosophy consists of nonsense. Empirical work is required to determine just how much. 4. The struggle to avoid nonsense (and achieve meaningfulness) is at least as important as the struggle for truth. The avoidance of nonsense is a precondition not just for having a truth value but also for more important properties such as saying something interesting or kind. (shrink)