- Rational Capacities.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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Weakness of will and practical irrationality.Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) - 2003 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Metaphysics.Richard Taylor - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
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Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 271-284.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Frankfurt-style compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.details
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Born yesterday: Personal autonomy for agents without a past.David Zimmerman - 1999 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):236–266.details
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Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365.details
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Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism.Gary Watson - 1999 - The Journal of Ethics 3 (4):353-368.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Précis of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):680-681.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review of Ferdinand Schoeman: Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. [REVIEW]Laurence Thomas - 1989 - Ethics 99 (4):950-951.details
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A hard-line reply to the multiple-case manipulation argument.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):160-170.details
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Reactive attitudes, reactivity, and omissions. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447-452.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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Moral responsibility and history revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.details
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Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):169-192.details
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Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37.details
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Defending nonhistorical compatibilism: A reply to Haji and cuypers1.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):264-280.details
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Assessing reasons - responsive compatibilism.Micheal S. McKenna - 2000 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (1):89 – 114.details
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A Hard‐line Reply to Pereboom’s Four‐Case Manipulation Argument 1.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Three Concepts of Free Action.Don Locke & Harry G. Frankfurt - 1975 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 49 (1):95-126.details
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Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Aborting the zygote argument.Stephen Kearns - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):379-389.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Compatibilism and the consequence argument.Terence Horgan - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.details
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Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):343 – 371.details
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Moral responsibility and the problem of manipulation reconsidered.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (4):439 – 464.details
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Free will as the ability to will.Bernard Gert & Timothy J. Duggan - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):197-217.details
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The importance of what we care about.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - Synthese 53 (2):257-272.details
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The Free will Revolution.John Martin Fischer - 2006 - The Journal of Ethics 10 (3):315-345.details
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Being is not believing: Fischer and Ravizza on taking responsibility.A. S. Eshleman - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):479 – 490.details
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The Non-Reality of Free Will.Richard Double - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Demetriou - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Knowing One’s Own Mind.Donald Davidson - 1987 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.details
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Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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