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  1. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.Robert Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa - 1957 - New York: Wiley.
    "The best book available for non-mathematicians." — Contemporary Psychology. Superb nontechnical introduction to game theory and related disciplines, primarily as applied to the social sciences. Clear, comprehensive coverage of utility theory, 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero-sum games, n-person games, individual and group decision-making, much more. Appendixes. Bibliography. Graphs and figures.
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  • The nomological character of microeconomics.Alexander Rosenberg - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (1):1-26.
  • Some formal problems with the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of two-person, zero-sum games, I: The direct proof.Edward F. McClennen - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1-2):1-28.
  • Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. [REVIEW]Piers Rawling - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):390-393.
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  • An incompleteness problem in Harsanyi's general theory of games and certain related theories of non-cooperative games.Edward F. McClennen - 1972 - Theory and Decision 2 (4):314-341.
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  • Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Is morality rational? In this book Gauthier argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. He proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of cooperation, rather than according to what would give an individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice (...)
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  • On arguments from self-interest for the Nash solution and the Kalai egalitarian solution to the bargaining problem.Luc Bovens - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (3):231-260.
    I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations (...)
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  • Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications.A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.) - 1978 - D. Reidel.
    Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, Vol. 11, 1-16. All Rights Reserved. Copyright © 1978 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, ...
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  • Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the (...)
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  • The minimax theory and expected-utility reasoning.Edward F. McClennen - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 337--367.