Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or cognitive (...) representation in AI. (shrink)

In this paper we reply to arguments of Kroon (“Characterization and Existence in Modal Meinongianism”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86, 23–34) to the effect that Modal Meinongianism cannot do justice to Meinongian claims such as that the golden mountain is golden, and that it does not exist.

Describes Bradley's doctrine of 'immediate experience' as a starting point of knowledge, then traces the development of the of subject and object out of immediate experience, with the question of independence, and with the precise meaning of the term 'objectivity.'.

The study aims at exposing Meinong's ideas that may be of interest to analytic philosophers. It contains all the basic information concerning Meinong's theory of objects with a special focus upon 'objectives', which are Meinong's propositions. Meinong's theory of meaning and his epistemological views are discussed in detail. An outline of his conception of truth, which is classified as firmly realistic, is followed by a review of the critical works touching upon Meinong's epistemological ideas. Finally, Meinong's theory of objects is (...) presented as inspiring the development of Meinongian logics, with his Aussersein as the prototype of an all-inclusive semantic domain. The issues considered include reference of terms and sentences as well as the general features of a Meinongian-style semantics. (shrink)

While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano s ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in (...) descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology.". (shrink)

The topic of this paper is the relationship between value facts (e.g., that this is good) and value experiences (e.g., appreciation). Its aim is, first, to give a concise account of the value theories of some important early phenomenologists (Franz Brentano, Christian von Ehrenfels, Alexius Meinong), second, to show that they raise questions and put forward arguments that are still worthy of note, and, third, to critically assess these arguments. Among others, the following questions are discussed: Can past and other (...) nonexistent objects have value? Are value experiences feelings or rather desires? Are value properties exemplified by “immanent objects” only? (shrink)

A brief introduction to Meinong, his theory of objects, and modern interpretations of it. Sections include: The Theory of Objects, Castañeda's Theory of Guises, Parsons,'s Theory of Nonexistent Objects, Rapaport's Theory of Meinongian Objects, Routley's Theory of Items.

Brentanos Reflexionen über das Verhältnis von Wahrheit und Evidenz wurden erst 1930 herausgegeben. Ihre Kenntnis ist unentbehrlich für das Verständnis seines Verhältnisses zu den an ihn anknüpfenden Denkern, insbesondere zu Husserl.

Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

This book covers the basic guidelines of Vittorio Benussi’s research during the period at Graz and at Padua. It does so in the light of a thorough study of his Nachlass. The book re-evaluates Benussi’s work as a historical piece, and shows how his work is still relevant today, especially in the areas of cognitive psychology and cognitive science. The volume deals with this original and ingenious - though largely ignored - scholar and discusses his work as a leading experimental (...) psychologist. Benussi’s contributions as discussed in this book were particularly relevant in the fields of visual and tactile perception, time perception, forensic psychology, hypnosis and suggestion, unconscious, and emotions. His classical papers are impressive in their originality, energy, range of approaches, experimental skill, the wealth of findings, and the quality of theoretical discussions. This book demonstrates that Benussi was ahead of his time and that his themes, experiments and research programmes are highly relevant to contemporary cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Als Schiiler Ernst Mallys hatte ich das Gluck, mitzuerleben, wie sich urn 1930 die Philosophie Mallys von der reichen Vielfalt der Meinongschen Lehre zu eigenen geschlosseneren Konturen wandelte. Es folgten Jahre intensiven Weiterbaus bis zum Todesjahr 1944. Durch widrige Um­ sHinde, Krankheit und Krieg, kamen Mallys Erkenntnisse nicht zu brei­ terer Wirkung. Urn so erfreulicher ist es, daB im Jahre des 25. Todestages und 90. Geburtstages ein Kreis Interessierter zusammenfand, urn ein Opus postumum MalIys, ein groBes logisches Fragment, von Mally (...) einmal Schwanberger Logik genannt, herauszugeben, das in den letzten Lebens­ jahren des Philosophen entstand. Auf Anregung von Professor Dr. Roderick M. Chisholm (Brown University, Rhode Island) wird gleich­ zeitig auch ein 'basic work' der Deontik, Mallys Grundgesetze des Sol/ens aus dem Jahr 1926, im Neudruck publiziert. Damit ist auch Gelegenheit gegeben, eine erste zusammenfassende Darstellung uber die Philosophie Mallys mit Schriftenverzeichnis etc. zu veroffentlichen, so daB diese Edition auch als Gedenkschrift fUr Mally gelten kann. (shrink)

This book tackles the issues that arise in connection with intensional logic -- a formal system for representing and explaining the apparent failures of certain important principles of inference such as the substitution of identicals and existential generalization -- and intentional states --mental states such as beliefs, hopes, and desires that are directed towards the world. The theory offers a unified explanation of the various kinds of inferential failures associated with intensional logic but also unifies the study of intensional contexts (...) and intentional states by grounding the explanation of both phenomena in a single theory. When an axiomatized realm of abstract entities is added to the metaphysical structure of the world, we can use them to identify and individuate the contents of directed mental states. The special abstract entities can be viewed as the objectified contents of mental files, and they play a crucial role in the analysis of truth conditions of the sentences involved in inferential failures. (shrink)

In this book, Zalta attempts to lay the axiomatic foundations of metaphysics by developing and applying a (formal) theory of abstract objects. The cornerstones include a principle which presents precise conditions under which there are abstract objects and a principle which says when apparently distinct such objects are in fact identical. The principles are constructed out of a basic set of primitive notions, which are identified at the end of the Introduction, just before the theorizing begins. The main reason for (...) producing a theory which defines a logical space of abstract objects is that it may have a great deal of explanatory power. It is hoped that the data explained by means of the theory will be of interest to pure and applied metaphysicians, logicians and linguists, and pure and applied epistemologists. (shrink)

Wittgenstein finished part 1 of the Philosophical Investigations in the spring of 1945. From 1946 to 1949 he worked on the philosophy of psychology almost without interruption. The present two-volume work comprises many of his writings over this period. Some of the remarks contained here were culled for part 2 of the Investigations ; others were set aside and appear in the collection known as Zettel . The great majority, however, although of excellent quality, have hitherto remained unpublished. This bilingual (...) edition of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology presents the first English translation of an essential body of Wittegenstein's work. It elaborates Wittgenstein's views on psychological concepts such as expectation, sensation, knowing how to follow a rule, and knowledge of the sensations of other persons. It also shows strong emphasis on the "anthropological" aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophers, as well as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists will welcome this important publication. (shrink)

This book is a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 1870s to the Anschluss in 1938. Thus it is intended as a contribution to the history of philosophy. But I hope that it will be seen also as a contribution to philosophy in its own right as an attempt to philosophize in the spirit of those, above all Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, who have done so much (...) to demonstrate the continued fertility of the ideas and methods of the Austrian philosophers in our own day. For some time now, historians of philosophy have been gradually coming to terms with the idea that post-Kantian philosophy in the German-speaking world ought properly to be divided into two distinct traditions which we might refer to as the German and Austrian traditions, respectively. The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line of the second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Mach and Meinong, and ending with Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper. As should be clear, it is the Austrian tradition that has contributed most to the contemporary mainstream of philosophical thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world. For while there are of course German thinkers who have made crucial contributions to the development of exact or analytic philosophy, such thinkers were outsiders when seen from the perspective of native German philosophical culture, and in fact a number of them found their philosophical home precisely in Vienna. When, in contrast, we examine the influence of the Austrian line, we encounter a whole series of familiar and unfamiliar links to the characteristic concerns of more recent philosophy of the analytic sort. As Michael Dummett points out in his Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the newly fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as "Anglo-American" is in this light a "grave historical distortion". If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy "could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian" (1988, p. 7). Much valuable scholarly work has been done on the thinking of Husserl and Wittgenstein, Mach and the Vienna Circle. The central axis of Austrian philosophy, however, which as I hope to show in what follows is constituted by the work of Brentano and his school, is still rather poorly understood. Work on Meinong or Twardowski by contemporary philosophers still standardly rests upon simplified and often confused renderings of a few favoured theses taken out of context. Little attention is paid to original sources, and little effort is devoted to establishing what the problems were by which the Austrian philosophers in general were exercised -- in spite of the fact that many of these same problems have once more become important as a result of the contemporary burgeoning of interest on the part of philosophers in problems in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)

By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...) three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., `the present King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. `a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerably difficulty; indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal refutation. All the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain. (shrink)

Meinong, like other noteworthy philosophers from central Europe, began his career in philosophy under the guidance of Franz Brentano. Though Meinong's philosophical investigations from early on were very Brentanian in character, he came to develop views that diverged from certain doctrines of his mentor. In epistemology Meinong introduced the notion of immediate evidence of surmise in his views on memory and perception, whereas Brentano found this notion unacceptable. In descriptive psychology Meinong regarded feelings and desires as two distinct classes and (...) introduced an additional class of mental phenomena called "assumptions". Thus he opposed Brentano's classification of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments, and acts of love and hate. In ontology Meinong allowed for non-real objects. In value theory he even introduced the notion of special irrealia corresponding to feelings and desires. Brentano, however, came to reject irrealia altogether. Such differences are discussed here, but attention is also given to the underlying and enduring philosophical affinity between Meinong and Brentano, namely their commitment to the ideal of scientific philosophy as attainable through descriptive psychology (what might be called "descriptive phenomenology"), which is concerned with intentionally directed consciousness as its subject matter and does not in any way differ methodologically from natural science. (shrink)

This essay re-examines Meinong's "Über Gegenstandstheorie" and undertakes a clarification and revision of it that is faithful to Meinong, overcomes the various objections to his theory, and is capable of offering solutions to various problems in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox (now known as "Clark's Paradox") that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinong-inspired theories of Hector-Neri Castañeda and Terence Parsons.

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

In this book Terence Parsons revives the older tradition of taking such objects at face value. Using various modern techniques from logic and the philosophy of language, he formulates a metaphysical theory of nonexistent objects. The theory is given a formalization in symbolism rich enough to contain definite descriptions, modal operators, and epistemic contexts, and the book includes a discussion which relates the formalized theory explicitly to English.

Alexius Meinong's specific use of the term "self-presentation" had a significant influence on modern epistemology and philosophical psychology. To show that there are remarkable parallels between Meinong's account of the self-presentation of experiences and Lehrer's account of the exemplarization of experiences is one of this paper's main objectives. Another objective is to put forward some comments and critical remarks to Lehrer's approach. One of the main problems can be expressed by the following: The process of using a particular experience as (...) a sample, that is, an exemplar that we use to stand for and refer to a plurality of experiences, Lehrer calls "exemplarization". As concrete experiences are multifarious (red and round, for example), how can we single out a specific sort of experiences (the red ones) by the process of exemplarization when we use such a multifarious experience as a sample? (shrink)

Trotz Luhmanns und Bourdieus Grundlagenwerke hat die Soziologie die empirische Erforschung und theoretische Analyse der Kunst weitgehend vernachlässigt. Ein soziologisch fundierter aktueller Aufriss des Kunstsystems liegt nicht vor. Einen Versuch dazu unternimmt Müller-Jentsch mit dieser Publikation, die fokussiert auf die soziologischen Begriffe von Organisation, Profession und Strategie Beiträge zu einer empirisch gerichteten Soziologie des Kunstsystems versammelt.

This article compares the theory of Meinongian objects proposed by Edward Zalta with a theory of fiction formulated within an early Russellian framework. The Russellian framework is the second-order intensional logic proposed by Nino B. Cocchiarelly as a reconstruction of the form of Logicism Russell was examining shortly after writing The Principles of Mathematics. A Russellian theory of denoting concepts is developed in this intensional logic and applied as a theory of the "objects' of fiction. The framework retains the Orthodox (...) early Russellian ontology of existents, possible non-existents, and properties and relations in intension. This avoids the assumption, found in Meinongian theories, of impossible and incomplete objects. It also obviates the need to preserve consistency by distinguishing a new "mode of predication", or a "distinction in kinds of predicates". Thus, it is argued that an early Russellian theory forms a powerful rival to a Meinongian theory of objects. (shrink)

As well as aiming to revive interest in Meinong's thought, this book challenges many of the most widespread assumptions of philosophical logic.

This book explores the thought of Alexius Meinong, a philosopher known for his unconventional theory of reference and predication. The chapters cover a natural progression of topics, beginning with the origins of Gegenstandstheorie, Meinong's theory of objects, and his discovery of assumptions as a fourth category of mental states to supplement his teacher Franz Brentano's references to presentations, feelings, and judgments. The chapters explore further the meaning and metaphysics of fictional and other nonexistent intended objects, fine points in Meinongian object (...) theory are considered and new and previously unanticipated problems are addressed. The author traces being and non-being, and aspects of beingless objects including objects in fiction, ideal objects in scientific theory, objects ostensibly referred to in false science and false history, and intentional imaginative projection of future states of affairs. The chapters focus on an essential choice of conceptual, logical, semantic, ontic and more generally metaphysical problems, and an argument is progressively developed from the first to the final chapter, as key ideas are introduced and refined. Meinong studies have come a long way from Bertrand Russell's off-target criticisms, and recent times have seen a rise of interest in a Meinongian approach to logic and the theory of meaning. New thinkers see Meinong as a bridge figure between analytic and continental thought, thanks to the need for an adequate semantics of meaning in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, making this book a particularly timely publication. (shrink)

Meinongs Leben vollzog sich in engen räumlichen Grenzen. Es scheint kaum von besonderen Höhepunkten gekennzeichnet zu sein. Als neunjähriger, im Jahre 1862, verließ er seine Geburtsstadt Lemberg und ging nach Wien, um dort die Schule zu besuchen und später deutsche Philologie und Geschichte zu studieren. Nach Abschluß einer Dissertation über Arnold von Brescia wandte er sich der Philosophie zu und habilitierte sich auf Empfehlung von Franz Brentano mit einer Arbeit über David Hume. Ein schweres Augenleiden, das sehr zeitig schon zu (...) einer fast vollständigen Blindheit führte und das er mit großem Erfindungsreichtum vor Familie, Freunden und administrativen Einrichtungen zu verbergen suchte, hat sein Leben maßgeblich bestimmt. Meinongs weitere akademische Karriere, die Beziehungen zu seiner Frau Doris, zu seinen Freunden und Studenten werden unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner Sehschwäche nachgezeichnet. (shrink)

This is an investigation into the fundamental connections between the referential use of language and our rich human experience. All types of experience — perceptual, practical, scientific, literary, esthetic, ludic,... — are tightly unified into one total experience by the structure of reference to real or possible items. Singular reference is essential for locating ourselves in our own corner of the world. General reference, by means of quantifiers, is our main tool in ascertaining the accessible patterns of the world. Both (...) are primitive and mutually irreducible. (Often this has been denied.) The unity of total experience is constructed through the biographical unity of a person, and the sociological unity of the communications across a community. This unity of experience is wrought out by an underlying unitary system of reference. We need, therefore, a comprehensive theory of individuation, existence, predication, and truth. One such a theory is Guise Theory. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der 1874 erschienenen bewußtseinspsychologischen Abhandlungen Brentanos steht die Beschreibung und Analyse des Psychischen. Damit bahnte sich jene Abwendung von der sensualistischen Tradition der philosophischen Bewußtseinslehre an, die in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls vollendet wurde.

Issues surrounding the status and nature of `nonexistent objects' constitute one of philosophy's oldest and densest thickets. In this book Perszyk takes his readers surefootedly through this thicket, informed both historically and at the level of contemporary discussion of relevant themes. His main aim is to develop a `bundle' or `set of properties' interpretation of Meinong's theory of nonexistent objects (as opposed to a set of properties neo-Meinongian metaphysics), and to defend this nonstandard interpretation against competing views in both the (...) philosophical and scholarly literature on Meinong. The Meinong who emerges is neither the hero nor the villain his friends and foes have commonly led us to believe. This clearly written book is a valuable addition both to the literature on Meinong and to contemporary metaphysics of modality. It is written for students and professionals interested in these, and related, areas. (shrink)

This book presents an historical and conceptual reconstruction of the theories developed by Meinong and a group of philosophers and experimental psychologists in Graz at the turn of the 19th century. Adhering closely to original texts, the contributors explore Meinong's roots in the school of Brentano, complex theories such as the theory of intentional reference and direct reference, and ways of developing philosophy which are closely bound up with the sciences, particularly psychology. Providing a faithful reconstruction of both Meinong's contributions (...) to science and the school that arose from his thought, this book shows how the theories of the Graz school raise the possibility of engaging in the scientific metaphysics and ontology that for so long have been considered off limits. (shrink)

Geschichts- und Lebensbilder werden im allgemeinen von Historikern aufgrund verschiedenartiger Quellen entworfen. In seltenen Fällen übernehmen es jene, die Geschichte machen, selbst, über Jahrzehnte ihr Leben und ihre Zeit zu dokumentieren. Die weitgehend erhaltene Korrespondenz zwischen dem Philosophen Alexius Meinong und dem Musikwissenschaftler Guido Adler ist ein solcher Glücksfall. Sie spiegelt die Lebensgeschichte der beiden Freunde im Kontext der Gesamtgeschichte. Der umfangreiche Briefwechsel ist aber weit mehr als eine eindrucksvolle Schilderung des bloß persönlichen Werdeganges von Meinong und Adler. Denn hier (...) wird ein faszinierendes Kapitel Universitäts- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte aufgeschlagen. Private und politische Intrigen, philosophische Schulenkämpfe, Berufungsdebatten, wie sie aus Akten- und Archivmaterial unvergleichlich weniger lebendig hervorgehen, erscheinen ebenso thematisiert wie wissenschaftliche Fragen. Denn eine Stütze der Freundschaft war das große Interesse, welches die beiden dem Fach des anderen entgegenbrachten - Vorbedingung für ein erfolgreiches Streben nach Interdisziplinarität. (shrink)