Focusing on God's essential attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, being eternal and omnipresent, being a creator and sustainer, and being a person, I examine how far recent discussion has been able to provide for each of these divine attributes a consistent interpretation. I also consider briefly whether the attributes are compatible with each other.

Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes.

This substantial anthology is a comprehensive, authoritative collection of the classical and contemporary readings in the philosophy of religion, providing a survey and analysis of the key issues, figures and concepts. Comprises the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of the classical and contemporary readings in the philosophy of religion. Provides a survey and analysis of the key issues, figures and concepts. Examines religious identity, theism and divine attributes, explanations of religion, and theistic arguments. Includes readings concerned with nontheistic religions, evils (...) and goods, religious values, personal identity, and death. (shrink)

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is a new annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy ...

According to one antitheist argument, the necessarily omniscient, necessarily omnipotent, and necessarily omnibenevolent Anselmian God does not exist, because if God is necessarily omnipotent it is impossible for Him to comprehend fully certain concepts, such as fear, frustration and despair, that an omniscient being needs to possess. Torin Alter examines this argument and provides three elaborate objections to it. I argue that theists would not accept any of them because they con ict with traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrines concerning divine attributes.