Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman & Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca - 1969 - Notre Dame, IN, USA: Notre Dame University Press.
    The New Rhetoric is founded on the idea that since “argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced,” says Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, and they rely, in particular, for their theory of argumentation on the twin concepts of universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed to a specific individual or group, the orator decides what information and what approaches will achieve (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   264 citations  
  • The Enigma of Reason.Dan Sperber & Hugo Mercier (eds.) - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
    Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn't it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.
  • Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
    How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment, then you should treat the advisor as a guru. Roughly, that means you should believe what you expect she would believe, if supplied with your extra evidence. When the advisor is your own future self, the resulting principle amounts to a version of the Reflection Principle---a version amended to handle cases of information loss. When you count an advisor as an epistemic (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   490 citations  
  • Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution.Michael J. Behe - 1996 - Free Press.
  • Collaborative Reasoning: Evidence for Collective Rationality.David Moshman Molly Geil - 1998 - Thinking and Reasoning 4 (3):231 – 248.
    Reasoning may be defined as a deliberate effort to coordinate inferences so as to reach justifiable conclusions. Thus defined, reasoning includes collaborative as well as individual forms of cognitive action. The purpose of the present study was to demonstrate a circumstance in which collaborative reasoning is qualitatively superior to individual reasoning. The selection task, a well known logical hypothesis-testing problem, was presented to 143 college undergraduates-32 individuals and 20 groups of 5 or 6 interacting peers. The correct (falsification) response pattern (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
    How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   496 citations  
  • The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2696 citations  
  • The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Chaïm Perelman - 1969 - Notre Dame, [Ind.]University of Notre Dame Press.
    The New Rhetoric is founded on the idea that since "argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced," says Chaïm Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, and they rely, in particular, for their theory of argumentation on the twin concepts of universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed to a specific individual or group, the orator decides what information and what approaches will achieve (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   245 citations  
  • On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - New York and London: Harper Torchbooks.
  • The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
  • Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.
    I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
    My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   254 citations  
  • The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   296 citations  
  • Knowing When Disagreements Are Deep.David M. Adams - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):65-77.
    Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Investigating the Shared Background Required for Argument: A Critique of Fogelin's Thesis on Deep Disagreement.Dana Phillips - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (2):86-101.
    Robert Fogelin claims that interlocutors must share a framework of background beliefs and commitments in order to fruitfully pursue argument. I refute Fogelin’s claim by investigating more thoroughly the shared background required for productive argument. I find that this background consists not in any common beliefs regarding the topic at hand, but rather in certain shared pro-cedural commitments and competencies. I suggest that Fogelin and his supporters mistakenly view shared beliefs as part of the required background for productive argument because (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Argumentation and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknown
    When epistemic peers disagree, what should a virtuous arguer do? Several options have been defended in the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, which connects interestingly to the controversy launched by Fogelin’s famous paper on ‘deep disagreement.’ I will argue that Fogelin’s case is transformed by the new work on disagreement, and that when seen in that broader epistemological context ‘deep’ disagreement is much less problematic for argumentation theory than it once seemed.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Emotional Backing and the Feeling of Deep Disagreement.Richard Friemann - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):51-63.
    I discuss Toulmin's (1964) concept of backing with respect to the emotional mode of arguing by examining an example from Fogelin (1985), where emotional backing justifies a warrant concerning when we should judge that a person is being pig-headed. While Fogelin 's treatment is consistent with contemporary emotion science, I show that it needs to be supplemented by therapeutic techniques by comparing an analysis of an emotional argument from Gilbert (1997). The introduction of psychotherapy into argumentation theory raises the question (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
    Short abstract (98 words). Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given humans’ exceptional dependence on communication and vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   316 citations  
  • The Role of Idealized Cases in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):251-270.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • An Evolutionary Perspective on Testimony and Argumentation.Dan Sperber - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):401-413.
  • The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
  • Reasonable Religious Disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Louise Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-214.
  • What Should We Do When We Disagree?Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 274-93.
    You and I have been colleagues for ten years, during which we have tirelessly discussed the reasons both for and against the existence of God. There is no argument or piece of evidence bearing directly on this question that one of us is aware of that the other is not—we are, then, evidential equals1 relative to the topic of God’s existence.2 There is also no cognitive virtue or capacity, or cognitive vice or incapacity, that one of us possesses that the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Disagreement. [REVIEW]Nathan Ballantyne & Nathan L. King - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):808-812.
  • Disagreement and Public Controversy.David Christensen - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    One of Mill’s main arguments for free speech springs from taking disagreement as an epistemically valuable resource for fallible thinkers. Contemporary conciliationist treatments of disagreement spring from the same motivation, but end up seeing the epistemic implications of disagreement quite differently. Conciliationism also encounters complexities when transposed from the 2-person toy examples featured in the literature to the public disagreements among groups that give the issue much of its urgency. Group disagreements turn out to be in some ways more powerful (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Indirect Epistemic Reasons and Religious Belief.Kirk Lougheed & Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Religious Studies 53 (2):151-169.
    If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence’s probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Persistent Disagreement.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Deep Disagreement and Informal Logic: No Cause for Alarm.Andrew Lugg - 1986 - Informal Logic 8 (1).
    An argument that the deepest disagreement can on occasion be resolved albeit over time.
    No categories
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • What Should We Do When We Disagree?J. Lackey - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Kuhn Thomas - 1962 - International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 2 (2).
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   294 citations  
  • Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science.José L. Duarte, Jarret T. Crawford, Charlotta Stern, Jonathan Haidt, Lee Jussim & Philip E. Tetlock - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38:1-54.
    Psychologists have demonstrated the value of diversity – particularly diversity of viewpoints – for enhancing creativity, discovery, and problem solving. But one key type of viewpoint diversity is lacking in academic psychology in general and social psychology in particular: political diversity. This article reviews the available evidence and finds support for four claims: Academic psychology once had considerable political diversity, but has lost nearly all of it in the last 50 years. This lack of political diversity can undermine the validity (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Revisiting Deep Disagreement.Dale Turner & Larry Wright - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):25-35.
    Argument-giving reasons for a view-is our model of rational dispute resolution. Fogelin suggests that certain "deep" disagreements cannot be resolved in this way because features of their context "undercut the conditions essential to arguing" . In this paper we add some detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable disagreements. In doing so we distinguish between his relatively modest claim that some disputes cannot be resolved through argument and his more radical claim that such disputes are beyond rational resolution. This distinction, along (...)
    Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Resolving Deep Disagreement.Vesel Memedi - 2007 - In Christopher W. Tindale Hans V. Hansen (ed.), Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. Ossa.
    The shocking statement made by Robert Fogelin over 20 years ago when he claimed that discourses that are in deep disagreement cannot be resolved rationally, is still causing many problems to argumentation theorists. In this paper, however, I argue that discourses that are in deep disagreement, at least some of them, can be rationally resolved by introducing the concept of “third party” to those particular discourses.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.
    The question I consider is this: -/- The Question: Can two people–who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree–both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? -/- I distinguish two kinds of rationality–internal and external–and argue in section 1 that, whichever kind we have in (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.
    The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Metarepresentations in an Evolutionary Perspective.Dan Sperber - 2000 - In [Book Chapter] (in Press). Oxford University Press.
    Humans are expert users of metarepresentations. How has this human metarepresentational capacity evolved? In order to contribute to the ongoing debate on this question, the chapter focuses on three more specific issues: i. How do humans metarepresent representations? ii. What came first: language, or metarepresentations? iii. Do humans have more than one metarepresentational ability?
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation.Ch Perelman, L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver - 1969 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (4):249-254.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   339 citations  
  • Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - In James Collier (ed.), The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. pp. 139-148.
    In this paper, I explain a challenge to the Equal Weight View coming from the psychology of group inquiry, and evaluate its merits. I argue that while the evidence from the psychology of group inquiry does not give us a reason to reject the Equal Weight View, it does require making some clarifications regarding what the view does and does not entail, as well as a revisiting the ethics of belief.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright & Denis Paul - 1972 - Mind 81 (323):453-457.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   109 citations  
  • On Certainty.Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. Anscombe, G. H. Von Wright, A. C. Danto & M. Bochner - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):261-262.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  • Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology.Michael Billig - 1995 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 28 (1):83-86.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   150 citations