Over the years a number of countries have abolished anonymous gamete donation and shifted toward open-identity policies. Donor-conceived children are said to have a fundamental “right to know” the identity of their donor. In this article, we trace the arguments that underlie this claim and question its implications. We argue that, given the status attributed to the right to know one's gamete donor, it would be discriminatory not to extend this right to naturally conceived children with misattributed paternity. One way (...) to facilitate this would be through routine paternity testing at birth. While this proposal is likely to raise concerns about the conflicting interests and rights of other people involved, we show that similar concerns apply to the context of open-identity gamete donation. Unless one can identify a rational basis for treating the two groups differently, one's stance toward both cases should be the same. (shrink)

Over the past years, a growing number of countries have legislated open-identity donation, in which donor-conceived offspring are given access to the donor’s identity once the child has reached maturity. It is held that donor anonymity creates identity problems for such children similar to the “genealogical bewilderment” described within the adoption context. The study of the social and psychological effects of open-identity donation is still very much in its infancy, but what has been left unquestioned is whether offering access to (...) the donor’s name and address is an adequate response to such effects. This study has two goals: First, we aim to provide a systematic review of the reasons why donor-conceived offspring want to know the identity of their sperm donor. Second, we examine to what extent the provision of donor-identifying information can satisfy the reasons mentioned. The most important motivations appear to be: to avoid medical risks and consanguineous relationships; to satisfy curiosity; to learn more about the self or to complete one’s identity; to learn more about what kind of person the donor is ; to form a relationship with the donor and/or his family; and to learn about one’s ancestry/genealogy. Our analysis shows that for nearly all of these reasons access to the donor’s identity is not necessary. In those cases where it is, moreover, donor identification is not sufficient. What is really needed is contact with the donor, rather than the mere provision of his name. (shrink)

It is widely agreed among health professionals that couples using donor insemination should be offered counselling on the topic of donor conception disclosure. However, it is clear from the literature that there has long been a lack of agreement about which counselling approach should be used in this case: a directive or a non-directive approach. In this paper we investigate which approach is ethically justifiable by balancing the two underlying principles of autonomy and beneficence. To overrule one principle in favour (...) of another, six conditions should be fulfilled. We analyse the arguments in favour of the beneficence principle, and consequently, a directive approach. This analysis shows that two conditions are not met; the principle of autonomy should not be overridden. Therefore, at this moment, a directive counselling approach on donor conception disclosure cannot be ethically justified. (shrink)

The vast majority of gamete donations worldwide are made anonymously, and in some countries, including Spain, France, and Denmark, the anonymity of donors is explicitly protected by law. Nonetheless, a growing number of countries have called into question the morality of such practices and are enacting laws allowing children access to identifying information about their gamete donor. A significant reason for the growing legislative support for nonanonymous gamete donations is the belief that donor‐conceived children have a fundamental moral right to (...) know their genetic origins and that the right should be legally protected. A variety of factors, such as the increasing number of children born by means of gamete donation, advances in genetic science and technology that make it easy to discover the identity of a person's genetic parents, and the widespread belief that genetic information is important for protecting people's health, have made this alleged right quite salient, even leading some to challenge the ethical appropriateness of gamete donation practices altogether. Often, however, this right is assumed rather than explicitly justified. The purpose of this paper is to call into question the ethical justifications that are often thought to ground a right to know one's genetic origins.Proponents of a right to know this information usually argue that such a right protects at least three vital interests: the interest of donor‐conceived people in having strong family relationships, their health interests, and their interest in forming a healthy identity. These different interests might be protected by different aspects of the right to know one's genetic origins: knowing one's mode of conception, accessing medically relevant information, and accessing identifying information about one's genetic parents. I will discuss each of these interests and explore whether and how they might be set back by an individual's lack of access to information about his or her genetic parentage. I will also evaluate whether donor anonymity policies are, as many of their opponents argue, morally impermissible because they fail to protect these important interests. (shrink)

The controversial question of whether a future child can be harmed by the use of reproductive technology turns on the way that the future child's identity is understood. As a result, analysis of the ethical and legal obligations to the children of reproductive technology that are based upon the possibility of such harm depends upon the conception of identity that is used. This paper reviews the contributions of two recent books, David DeGrazia's Human Identity and Bioethics (2005) and Philip Peters' (...) How Safe is Safe Enough? (2004) to this area of inquiry. It suggests that the use of a narrative rather than numerical conception of identity makes it possible to coherently claim that future children can be harmed by the use of reproductive technologies and that, as a result, potential parents can have obligations regarding the use of those technologies based upon that possibility of harm. (shrink)

This paper overviews key empirical findings from social science research regarding the impact of gamete donation on child wellbeing. In particular, the paper addresses current regulatory debates concerning information sharing and the best interests of the child by considering psychosocial aspects of telling—or not telling—children about their donor conception and the identity of their donor. The paper identifies three core sets of empirical, ethical and policy concerns underpinning these debates relating to the psychosocial impact of gamete donation per se on (...) child wellbeing, the psychosocial impact of parental disclosure decisions on child wellbeing, and the psychosocial implications of donor identification for donor-conceived offspring. The paper illustrates how these concerns are framed by ideas about the significance—or not—of ‘genetic relatedness’; ideas which have come to the fore in contemporary discussions about the potential consequences of donor-conceived individuals gaining access to their donor’s identity. By drawing together research findings that may be pertinent to the regulation of gamete donation and information sharing, a further aim of this paper is to explore the potential use and misuse of empirical ‘evidence’ in ethical and policy debates. Whilst this paper starts from the premise that psychosocial data has a vital role in grounding normative discussions, it seeks to contribute to this dialogue by highlighting both the value and limitations of social science research. In particular, the paper argues for a cautious approach to applying psychosocial evidence to ethical issues that is sensitive to the caveats and nuances of research findings and the changing cultural and regulatory context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948;Bearing in mind the (...) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

A growing number of jurisdictions hold that gamete donors must be identifiable to the children born with their eggs or sperm, on grounds that being able to know about one's genetic origins is a fundamental moral right. But the argument for that belief has not yet been adequately made.

Telling the truth is one of the most respected virtues in medical history and one of the most emphasized in the code of medical ethics. Health care providers are frequently confronted with the dilemma as to whether or not to tell the truth. This dilemma deepens when both choices are critically vicious: The choice is no longer between “right and right” or “right and wrong,” it is between “wrong and wrong.” In the case presented and discussed in this paper, a (...) research team in Saudi Arabia unintentionally uncovered information regarding misattributed paternity. In such a situation and in the context of a tribal cultural system, what should the team do with this information? This case analysis demonstrates the joint application of ethical resources originating from within and outside the Saudi Arabian context. The article analyses the case based on the moral problems involved, relevant medical application, and the impact of such information in the Saudi tribal and Islamic domains. The most pertinent relevant values and secular debates on similar matters are discussed. Finally, the article aims to provide an Islamic dimension of family, fatherhood, and adultery. (shrink)

When philosophers address personal identity, they usually explore numerical identity: what are the criteria for a person's continuing existence? When non-philosophers address personal identity, they often have in mind narrative identity: Which characteristics of a particular person are salient to her self-conception? This book develops accounts of both senses of identity, arguing that both are normatively important, and is unique in its exploration of a range of issues in bioethics through the lens of identity. Defending a biological view of our (...) numerical identity and a framework for understanding narrative identity, DeGrazia investigates various issues for which considerations of identity prove critical: the definition of death; the authority of advance directives in cases of severe dementia; the use of enhancement technologies; prenatal genetic interventions; and certain types of reproductive choices. He demonstrates the power of personal identity theory to illuminate issues in bioethics as they bring philosophical theory to life. (shrink)