- Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Metaphysics.Richard Taylor - 1963 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Frankfurt-style counterexamples and begging the question.Stewart Goetz - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):83-105.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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Alternative possibilities, moral obligation, and moral responsibility.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (1):41-50.details
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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Introduction: The contours of contemporary free will debates.Robert H. Kane - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A master argument for incompatibilism?Tomis Kapitan - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 127--157.details
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Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Ifs, Cans, and Free Will: The Issues.Bernard Berofsky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Towards a reasonable libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 31.details
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Frankfurt-style compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2002 - In Sarah Buss & Lee Overton (eds.), Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. MIT Press, Bradford Books.details
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Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):231-248.details
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'Ought' implies 'can' and the principle of alternate possibilities.G. Yaffe - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):218-222.details
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Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency.Gideon Yaffe - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2):178-221.details
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Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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Asymmetrical freedom.Susan Wolf - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):151-66.details
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Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt Scenarios.David Widerker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):163-187.details
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):247-61.details
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Frankfurt on 'Ought implies Can' and alternative possibilities.David Widerker - 1991 - Analysis 51 (4):222.details
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Farewell to the Direct Argument.David Widerker - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.details
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Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.details
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Excusing addiction.Gary Watson - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):589-619.details
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Excusing Addiction.Gary Watson - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):589-619.details
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Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible.Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):215-26.details
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Determinism and Moral Responsibility Are Incompatible.Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):215-226.details
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Causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible: A new argument for incompatibilism.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:167-180.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Addiction as defect of the will: Some philosophical reflections. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654.details
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Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Kadri Vihvelin - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-23.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Responsibility and the aims of theory: Strawson and revisionism.Manuel Vargas - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2):218-241.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The direct argument for incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Eleonore Stump - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.details
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The unhelpfulness of determinism. [REVIEW]Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.details
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Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The impertinence of Frankfurt-style argument.Daniel James Speak - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.details
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Free-will, praise and blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.details
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Free will, praise and blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.details
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