Anscombe guides us through the Tractatus and, thereby, Wittgenstein's early philosophy as a whole. She shows in particular how his arguments developed out of the discussions of Russell and Frege. This reprint is of the fourth, corrected edition.

"One of the most impressive pieces of scholarship I have ever encountered."-W. E. Kennick, Amherst College There is nothing in the literature on the Philosophical Investigations comparable to this learned and exhaustive commentary. Offering both information and interpretation, it is a remarkable book that fills a recognized need for a close study of one of the world's major works of philosophy. After a general introduction, Father Hallett divides the text of the Investigations into forty-one units, and then provides an introduction (...) to each section, along with detailed comments on individual paragraphs, statements, and expressions. His use of paragraph numbers in the general introduction and in the sectional introductions permits ready reference downward, for detailed development or illustration of a general observation, or upward, from a particular passage to its wider context. To clarify the philosophical point of Wittgenstein's remarks, Father Hallett makes frequent references to other parts of the Investigations; to Wittgenstein's other writings, both published and unpublished; and to the works which Wittgenstein knew and often had in mind, such as those of Frege, Russell, Moore, James, Augustine, Plato, Schlick, and Kohler. Father Hallett also cites and quotes secondary sources, and he includes an appendix relating Wittgenstein to more than 150 authors, particularly those of his own generation or earlier whom he read, or knew personally, and who are mentioned in this commentary. Written in straightforward and lucid prose, this outstanding book reveals continuities in Wittgenstein's thought over long periods of time. It is an indispensable guide for those preparing courses on the Investigations and a useful tool for students taking those courses. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V Notes References.

This is a revised and enlarged version of Bryan Magee's widely praised study of Schopenhauer, the most comprehensive book on this great philosopher. It contains a brief biography of Schopenhauer, a systematic exposition of his thought, and a critical discussion of the problems to which it gives rise and of its influence on a wide range of thinkers and artists. For this new edition Magee has added three new chapters and made many minor revisions and corrections throughout. This new edition (...) will consolidate the book's standing as the definitive study of Schopenhauer. (shrink)

Beginning with a research review, the present paper shows that Hans Slugaʼs and esp. Robert Brandomʼs thesis, according to which Frege has adopted the context-principle and the priority of propositional from Kant, can solve problems in current Frege scholarship, on the one hand, but is itself fraught with further problems, on the other hand. In contrast, this paper maintains that the context-principle and the priority of the propositional are implicitly present in Fregeʼs Begriffsschrift since both have not been taken over (...) from Kant, but rather from neo-Aristotelianism: The context-principle and the priority of the propositional were first drawn up in 1834 by O. F. Gruppe. As a consequence, A. F. Trendelenburg has published a re-arranged edition of Aristotleʼs Organon in 1836 which became one of the most influential schoolbooks on logic in the 19th century and of which Frege ought to have been aware. In the beginning of this schoolbook, using the original ancient Greek sentences of Aristotle, the priority of the propositional (De int. I 1) is deduced from the context-principle (De anima III 6). (shrink)

Wittgenstein always thought that he had not been understood, and indeed that it was very unlikely that many people ever would understand him. Russell not only failed to understand Wittgenstein's later work; according to Wittgenstein himself, Russell profoundly failed to understand even the Tractatus . Professor Anscombe says even she did not understand him, and that to attempt to give an account of what he says is only to express one's own ordinariness or mediocrity or lack of complexity. Certainly, most (...) people acquainted with the Tractatus , when that work was Wittgenstein's only published book, gave it what now seems a quite crass positivistic interpretation. Wittgenstein's own preface to the Tractatus , despite its last sentence, does not help. He does tell us that the whole sense of the work is that what can be said can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence: but this does not make it clear that what we cannot talk about is all that is really important. Even when one has realised all this, however, one is aware mostly of one's failure to understand; and that if one did get any distance in understanding the last sixth of the Tractatus , the process would be extremely difficult, and the results quite astonishing. (shrink)

Wittgenstein always thought that he had not been understood, and indeed that it was very unlikely that many people ever would understand him. Russell not only failed to understand Wittgenstein's later work; according to Wittgenstein himself, Russell profoundly failed to understand even the Tractatus. Professor Anscombe says even she did not understand him, and that to attempt to give an account of what he says is only to express one's own ordinariness or mediocrity or lack of complexity. Certainly, most people (...) acquainted with the Tractatus, when that work was Wittgenstein's only published book, gave it what now seems a quite crass positivistic interpretation. Wittgenstein's own preface to the Tractatus, despite its last sentence, does not help. He does tell us that the whole sense of the work is that what can be said can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence: but this does not make it clear that what we cannot talk about is all that is really important. Even when one has realised all this, however, one is aware mostly of one's failure to understand; and that if one did get any distance in understanding the last sixth of the Tractatus, the process would be extremely difficult, and the results quite astonishing. (shrink)

Three claims wittgenstein makes in the tractatus are explicated via schopenhauer's idealism: 1) ethical reward and punishment lie in the action itself, 2) the good or bad exercise of the will alter the world's limits, So that it waxes or wanes, 3) eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Schopenhauer's theory fills out some of wittgenstein's statements. For example, The happy man's world waxes to the degree that he frees himself from the false perspective of the "principium (...) individuationis". However, The link between schopenhauer's metaphysics and his ethics is tighter than the analogous link in wittgenstein. (shrink)

This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has (...) found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible. (shrink)