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  1. Sentience and Behaviour.Robert Kirk - 1974 - Mind 83 (January):43-60.
  • The Role of Private Events in the Interpretation of Complex Behavior.David C. Palmer - 2009 - Behavior and Philosophy 37:3 - 19.
    Like most other sciences, behavior analysis adopts an assumption of uniformity, namely that principles discovered under controlled conditions apply outside the laboratory as well. Since the boundary between public and private depends on the vantage point of the observer, observability is not an inherent property of behavior. From this perspective, private events are assumed to enter into the same orderly relations as public behavior, and the distinction between public and private events is merely a practical one. Private events play no (...)
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  • The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
    Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different (...)
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  • George Graham.Peter R. Killeen, Robert Epstein, Willard F. Day Jr, K. Richard Garrett, Max Hocutt, Wv Quine, Roger Schna1tter, Donald Baer, William Baum & David Begelman - 1985 - Behaviorism 13.
  • An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
  • Reduction of Mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
  • The Inaugural Address: Why There Couldn't Be Zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1–16.
    Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. My strategy has two prongs: a fairly brisk argument which demolishes the zombie idea; followed by an attempt to throw light on how something can qualify as a conscious perceiver. The argument to show that zombies are impossible (...)
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  • Behaviour.David W. Hamlyn - 1953 - Philosophy 28 (April):132-45.
  • On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures.Julia Tanney - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):173-186.
    In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are "on the inside." My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical "intuitions". Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and propositional attitude (...)
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  • Dynamic Interactions With the Environment Make Up Our Psychological Phenomena: A Review of Noë’s Out of Our Heads. [REVIEW]Filipe Lazzeri - 2015 - The Psychological Record 65 (1):215-222.
    The traditional, and still standard, view of psychological phenomena in some empirical sciences holds that they take place inside the organism’s body and can be individuated independently of external factors. The organism’s behaviors are, according to this view, mere effects, rather then constituents, of psychological phenomena. And the fact that, for example, an organism is desiring something instead of something else is taken to be a matter entirely of what is inside the organism. The current versions of the view are (...)
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  • Functionalism.Ned Block - 1980 - In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology.
    What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the most general level, what makes a mental state mental? Or more specifically, What do thoughts have in common in virtue of which they are thoughts? That is, what makes a thought a thought? What makes a pain a pain? (...)
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  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.
  • Principles of Behavior. An Introduction to Behavior Theory. [REVIEW]E. N. - 1943 - Journal of Philosophy 40 (20):558-559.
  • Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.
  • Behaviorism and Psychologism: Why Block’s Argument Against Behaviorism is Unsound.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):179-186.
    Ned Block. Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5-43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that it (...)
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  • Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories.Richard Rorty - 1965 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (1):24-54.
    CURRENT CONTROVERSIES about the Mind-Body Identity Theory form a case-study for the investigation of the methods practiced by linguistic philosophers. Recent criticisms of these methods question that philosophers can discern lines of demarcation between "categories" of entities, and thereby diagnose "conceptual confusions" in "reductionist" philosophical theories. Such doubts arise once we see that it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to draw a firm line between the "conceptual" and the "empirical," and thus to differentiate between a statement embodying a conceptual (...)
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  • Psychologism and Behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
    Let psychologism be the doctrine that whether behavior is intelligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing that produces it. More specifically, I mean psychologism to involve the doctrine that two systems could have actual and potential behavior _typical_ of familiar intelligent beings, that the two systems could be exactly alike in their actual and potential behavior, and in their behavioral dispositions and capacities and counterfactual behavioral properties (i.e., what behaviors, behavioral dispositions, and behavioral capacities they would (...)
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  • White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):156.
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  • Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.R. J. Hirst - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (37):366-373.
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  • The Inaugural Address: Why There Couldn't Be Zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 73:1-16.
    Philosophical zombies are exactly as physicalists suppose we are, right down to the tiniest details, but they have no conscious experiences. Are such things even logically possible? My aim is to contribute to showing not only that the answer is 'No', but why. My strategy has two prongs: a fairly brisk argument which demolishes the zombie idea; followed by an attempt to throw light on how something can qualify as a conscious perceiver. The argument to show that zombies are impossible (...)
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  • Science and Human Behavior.Harry Prosch - 1953 - Ethics 63 (4):314-314.
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  • The Inaugural Address: Why There Couldn’T Be Zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (1):1-16.
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  • Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.Max R. Bennett & P. M. S. Hacker - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:71-87.
    The book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" is an engaging criticism of cognitive neuroscience from the perspective of a Wittgensteinian philosophy of ordinary language. The authors' main claim is that assertions like "the brain sees" and "the left hemisphere thinks" are integral to cognitive neuroscience but that they are meaningless because they commit the mereological fallacy—ascribing to parts of humans, properties that make sense to predicate only of whole humans. The authors claim that this fallacy is at the heart of Cartesian (...)
     
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  • Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.
     
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  • Content and Consciousness: An Analysis of Mental Phenomena.D. C. DENNETT - 1969
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  • Wittgenstein's Language-Games and the Call to Cognition.Samuel M. Deitz - 1984 - Behavior and Philosophy 12 (2):1.
    The transition toward cognitive issues in the experimental analysis of behavior is examined. The article shows how the conceptual analysis provided by Wittgenstein in his description of language-games can assist experimental analysts in evaluating the transition. Various philosophical theories of the meaning of psychological terms are discussed as are four components of language-games. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's analysis allows behaviorists to use cognitive terms with a behavioristic system and that with such a system sharper distinctions among types of complex, (...)
     
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  • Attacking the Bounds of Cognition.Richard Menary - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.
    Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that (...)
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  • What is This Cognition That is Supposed to Be Embodied?Ken Aizawa - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):755-775.
    Many cognitive scientists have recently championed the thesis that cognition is embodied. In principle, explicating this thesis should be relatively simple. There are, essentially, only two concepts involved: cognition and embodiment. After articulating what will here be meant by ‘embodiment’, this paper will draw attention to cases in which some advocates of embodied cognition apparently do not mean by ‘cognition’ what has typically been meant by ‘cognition’. Some advocates apparently mean to use ‘cognition’ not as a term for one, among (...)
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  • A Tentative Analysis of the Primary Data of Psychology.J. R. Kantor - 1921 - Journal of Philosophy 18 (10):253-269.
  • Mental Acts: their Content and their Object.P. Geach - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):216-217.
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  • Why There Couldn’T Be Zombies.Robert Kirk - 1999 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 73 (1):1-16.
  • A Defense of Behaviorism.Mark Rowlands - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):93-100.
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