La première grande question qui se pose au lecteur de la Critique de la Raison Dialectique est certainement celle des rapports entre les problématiques sartrienne et marxiste. Dans sa conclusion à Questions de Méthode, Sartre la forrnule clairement en écrivant que l'existentialisme « ne remet rien en question, sauf un déterminisme mécaniste qui n'est précisément pas marxiste et qu'on a introduit du dehors dans cette philosophie totale. Il veut, lui aussi, situer l'homme dans sa classe et dans les conflits qui (...) l'opposent aux autres classes à partir du mode et des relations de production. Mais il veut tenter cette ‘situation’, à partir de l'existence, c'est-à-dire de la compréhension ». En termes plus généraux, l'existentialisme « veut dans le Savoir même et dans l'universalité des concepts réintroduire l'indépassable singularité de l'aventure humaine ». Nous sommes donc ici simultanément en présence d'une profession de foi dans le marxisme—car même la carence que Sartre reproche à celui-ci, l'élimination de l'homme, «tient à l'événement et non aux principes mêmes de la doctrine»—et d'une volonté d'introduire dans cette philosophie une méthode propre à l'idéologie de l'existence. (shrink)

To treat existentialism as a philosophy is no more possible than to treat idealism as a philosophy. The reason is obvious. Jean-Paul Sartre is an existentialist and Gabriel Marcel is also an existentialist; but the philosophy of Sartre is not the same as the philosophy of Marcel. One can no more speak of the philosophy of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel and Berdyaev, as though they maintained the same system, than one could speak of the philosophy of Plato, Berkeley and (...) Hegel, as though one philosophy was common to the three thinkers. Of course, if one took idealism in the sense in which the Marxist uses the term, as meaning the doctrine that mind is prior to matter, i.e. as opposed to materialism , one would have a definite theme to consider; but one would be forced to recognize as idealists thinkers who would never call themselves by that name and who would not be generally recognized as such. Similarly, if one said that existentialism is the doctrine that man is free and that what he makes of himself depends on himself, on his free choices, one would doubtless have mentioned a doctrine which is common to the existentialists and which they insist upon; but one would at the same time be forced to include in the ranks of the existentialists philosophers whose inclusion would be manifestly absurd. (shrink)

Est-il exact que tout système philosophique ne soit, comme le voulait Nietzsche, qu'une confession déguisée? Pour la grande majorité des philosophies, nous ne pouvons répondre à cette question, faute de renseignements suffisants, mais peut-être l'autobiographie de Sartre nous apportera-t-elle une contribution valable. Nous essayerons done de l'examiner comme document historique et comme document psychologique.

Le thème le plus fréquemment modulé par la philosophie actuelle, celui de l'intentionnalité de la conscience, s'inscrit à vrai dire dans le courant le plus constant de la philosophia perennis. Il s'agit du souci de rechercher le statut de l'esprit aux prises avec les objets qui ne sont tels que par rapport à sa présence. Un représentant accrédité de la philosophie contemporaine écrit que « le problème de l'existence du monde extérieur ne présente à la rigueur aucun sens quelconque ». (...) En effet, le monde extérieur est affirmé par la conscience immédiate et la tâche dévolue a la conscience réfléchissante, c'est de revenir sur ces données pour les thématiser et établir les rapports essentiels qui les constituent dans l'existence. Une conscience pure qui existerait avant tout contact avec ce qui n'est pas elle semble bien un rêve à jamais évanoui. Avant la mise entre parenthèses prônée par Husserl, la philosophie cartésienne nous assurait que « tout état de conscience en général est en lui-même conscience de quelque chose, quoi qu'il en soit de l'existence réelle de cet objet et quelque abstention que je fasse de la position de cette existence ». Les termes d'intentionnalité et de visée intentionnelle caractérisent cette particularité de la conscience d'être toujours au moins conscience de quelque chose. (shrink)

Camus thinks no conciliation possible, that the two doctrines can be maintained at the same time only by a sort of hypocrisy, that Sartre accords an absolute freedom to man only so that he may submit to the yoke of Marxism. But that is because Camus is ignorant of the merits of phenomenology. If Existentialism and Marx have too many corners to fit together, well, then Marx must be put in brackets and deprived of his natural presuppositions and pretensions. And (...) the first false evidence to be discarded will be that of matter. (shrink)

This is especially clear in the case of Jean Paul Sartre's philosophy of freedom. Existentialists in general and Sartre in particular argue that an analysis, not of human nature, indeed, but of, say, "the universal human condition" reveals that certain kinds of behavior are morally appropriate and others morally reprehensible. My aim in this paper is to show that Sartre's analysis of "the universal human condition" is quite inconsistent with morality in anything like the ordinary sense. We might think that (...) attempt otiose in view of Sartre's notorious rejection of "absolute values." But in spite of his claim to dispense with absolute morality, Sartre's philosophy, like other existentialist philosophies, is through-and-through ethical. A concern with the human condition and its implications for morality is the moving force behind Sartre's thought. "Bad faith," "responsibility," "anguish,"--these and other ethical notions play a central role in Sartre's philosophy of freedom. Though he has in one sense rejected "absolute values" in another sense he accepts the absolute values of authenticity and good faith, recommends these values to others, and passes moral judgment upon those who live in "bad faith.". (shrink)

Having indicated my own enthusiasm for the project, I must hasten to add that it is precisely the explicit philosophical concern of existential psychoanalysis which constitutes its greatest vulnerability. No matter how strong one's interest in metaphysics may be and, hence, his initial sympathy with the metaphysical component in existential psychoanalysis, if one is critical and honest he cannot long avoid the question: what will be the results for psychoanalysis as a science? Two considerations are bound to give the philosopher (...) pause: Modern experimental science deliberately and willfully cut itself free from metaphysical speculation; up to the point where it failed to take this step, its progress was minimal. There are, I think, obvious dangers involved in empirical science either becoming too explicitly metaphysical or attempting to adapt itself to an antecedently available metaphysical system. I do not mean to suggest that metaphysics has not or cannot contribute to natural science, but only to underscore the fact that natural science has attained at least a relative autonomy. The physicist develops his own metaphysics to serve his own purposes and there is good reason to believe that he is well advised in doing so. (shrink)

THE rapprochement of existential and Marxist philosophy has received a good deal of attention since Sartre published in 1960 his Critique de la raison dialectique. Its introduction, Question de méthode, has been translated into English by Hazel Barnes. At least two major explications of the work have appeared in the last two years. Extensive reviews have appeared in philosophical journals in this country and abroad. Finally, at least one critical study devoted explicitly to the problems such a marriage entails was (...) published last year in paperback format. Another publication which brings together a collection of essays and excerpts is titled Existentialism Versus Marxism and has already decided the future of the marriage by its sub-title: "Conflicting Views on Humanism.". (shrink)

This is a study of all the recent literature on william james written from a phenomenological perspective with the purpose of showing that william james made fundamental contributions to the phenomenological theory of the intentionality of consciousness, To the phenomenological theory of self-Identity, And to the phenomenological conception of noetic freedom as the basic concept of ethical theory.