- Immediate justification and process reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-82.details
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Epistemic values and the argument from inductive risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.details
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A refutation of the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing.Stephen Spielman - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):201-222.details
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The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.details
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What type of Type I error? Contrasting the Neyman–Pearson and Fisherian approaches in the context of exact and direct replications.Mark Rubin - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5809–5834.details
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Frequentist probability and frequentist statistics.J. Neyman - 1977 - Synthese 36 (1):97 - 131.details
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Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.details
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What Is a Replication?Edouard Machery - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):545-567.details
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Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks.Adam P. Kubiak, Paweł Kawalec & Adam Kiersztyn - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (4):585-604.details
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Science, truth, and democracy.Philip Kitcher - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Adjusting Inferential Thresholds to Reflect Nonepistemic Values.Kim Kaivanto & Daniel Steel - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (2):255-285.details
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Inductive risk and the contexts of communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.details
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Why Most Published Research Findings Are False.John P. A. Ioannidis - 2005 - PLoS Med 2 (8):e124.details
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Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Cognitive Science.details
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Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences.Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton - 2009 - Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (1):107-143.details
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The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.details
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Risk and Values in Science: A Peircean View.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (4):329-346.details
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In defence of the value free ideal.Gregor Betz - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (2):207-220.details
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Statistical Decision Functions.Abraham Wald - 1950 - Wiley: New York.details
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Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science.Kevin Christopher Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.) - 2017 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.details
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Science in a democratic society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.details
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Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality.William C. Wimsatt - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The social construction of what?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.details
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The Epistemic, the Cognitive, and the Social.Larry Laudan - 2004 - In Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Science, values, and objectivity. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 14-23.details
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Truth as the Epistemic Goal.Marian David - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-169.details
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Statistical Power and P-values: An Epistemic Interpretation Without Power Approach Paradoxes.Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda - unknowndetails
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Science in a Democratic Society.Philip Kitcher - 2011 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101:95-112.details
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Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Piecewise Approximations to Reality.William C. Wimsatt - 2010 - Critica 42 (124):108-117.details
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