One of the standard ways of postulating large cardinal axioms is to consider elementary embeddings,j, from the universe,V, into some transitive submodel,M. See Reinhardt–Solovay [7] for more details. Ifjis not the identity, andκis the first ordinal moved byj, thenκis a measurable cardinal. Conversely, Scott [8] showed that wheneverκis measurable, there is suchjandM. If we had assumed, in addition, that, thenκwould be theκth measurable cardinal; in general, the wider we assumeMto be, the largerκmust be.

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call “formalism freeness” from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability. We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic in the (...) 20th century. (shrink)

In this paper we consider whether L(R) has “enough information” to contain a counterexample to the continuum hypothesis. We believe this question provides deep insight into the difficulties surrounding the continuum hypothesis. We show sufficient conditions for L(R) not to contain such a counterexample. Along the way we establish many results about nonstationary towers, non-reflecting stationary sets, generalizations of proper and semiproper forcing and Chang's conjecture.

A forcing poset of size 221 which adds no new reals is described and shown to provide a Δ22 definable well-order of the reals . The encoding of this well-order is obtained by playing with products of Aronszajn trees: some products are special while other are Suslin trees. The paper also deals with the Magidor–Malitz logic: it is consistent that this logic is highly noncompact.