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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
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Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind.Nick Zangwill - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.details
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II—Moral Dependence and Natural Properties.Nick Zangwill - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):221-243.details
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Knowledge requires commitment (instead of belief).Nicholas Tebben - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):321-338.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.details
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Against Essential Mental Normativity Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):333-346.details
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Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.details
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Moral and Rational Commitment.Sam Shpall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):146-172.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.details
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Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?Debbie Roberts - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Depending on the Thick.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):197-220.details
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Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self‐Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):423-426.details
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The truth Norm of belief.Conor Mchugh - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):8-30.details
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Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint.Daniel Laurier - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):315-331.details
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Anti-Normativism Evaluated.Ulf Hlobil - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):376-395.details
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Thoughts and norms.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):83-98.details
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Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
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Some Philosophical Integrations.Akeel Bilgrami - 2006 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 50–72.details
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Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Some Philosophical Integrations.Akeel Bilgrami - 2006 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 6--50.details
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The normativity of the intentional.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.details
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How Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oxford University Press.details
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How to Derive Ought from Is.John Searle - 1964 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral epistemology and the Because Constraint.Nick Zangwill - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell. pp. 263--281.details
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How reasons for action differ from reasons for belief.Alan Millar - 2009 - In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.details
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Form and content in ethical theory.Wilfrid Sellars - unknowndetails
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Belief, Correctness and normativity.Davide Fassio - 2011 - Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):471.details
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Commitment and change of view.Isaac Levi - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press. pp. 209--232.details
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The normative character of belief.Thomas Baldwin - 2007 - In Mitchell S. Green & John N. Williams (eds.), Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford University Press.details
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