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Disability and Mere Difference

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Ethics 126 (3):774-788 (2016)

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  1. Causing Disabled People to Exist and Causing People to Be Disabled.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - Ethics 116 (1):77-99.
    Attempts to determine or to select what kind of person or people to bring into existence are controversial. This is particularly true of “negative selection” or “selecting against” a certain type of person—that is, the attempt to prevent a person of a certain type, or people of that type, from existing. Virtually everyone agrees that some instances of negative selection are objectionable—for example, that selection against healthy people would be wrong, particularly if this were combined with positive selection of people (...)
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  • Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193-214.
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
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  • One principle and three fallacies of disability studies.J. Harris - 2001 - Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (6):383-387.
    My critics in this symposium illustrate one principle and three fallacies of disability studies. The principle, which we all share, is that all persons are equal and none are less equal than others. No disability, however slight, nor however severe, implies lesser moral, political or ethical status, worth or value. This is a version of the principle of equality. The three fallacies exhibited by some or all of my critics are the following: Choosing to repair damage or dysfunction or to (...)
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  • Valuing Disability, Causing Disability.Elizabeth Barnes - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):88-113.
    Disability rights activists often claim that disability is not—by itself—something that makes disabled people worse off. A popular objection to such a view of disability is this: were it correct, it would make it permissible to cause disability and impermissible to cause nondisability. The aim of this article is to show that these twin objections don’t succeed.
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