Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The development of conscious control in childhood.Philip David Zelazo - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):12-17.
  • Subjective visibility depends on level of processing.Bert Windey, Wim Gevers & Axel Cleeremans - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):404-409.
  • Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness ratings.Michał Wierzchoń, Borysław Paulewicz, Dariusz Asanowicz, Bert Timmermans & Axel Cleeremans - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 27:109-120.
  • Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.Tim van Gelder & Andy Clark - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):647.
    A great deal of philosophy of mind in the modern era has been driven by an intense aversion to Cartesian dualism. In the 1950s, materialists claimed to have succeeded once and for all in exorcising the Cartesian ghost by identifying the mind with the brain. In subsequent decades, cognitive science put scientific meat on this metaphysical skeleton by explicating mental processes as digital computation implemented in the brain's hardware.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   328 citations  
  • Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness.Evan Thompson & Francisco J. Varela - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (10):418-425.
  • Two theories of consciousness: Semantic pointer competition vs. information integration.Paul Thagard & Terrence C. Stewart - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:73-90.
  • The perception of visual emotion: Comparing different measures of awareness.Remigiusz Szczepanowski, Jakub Traczyk, Michał Wierzchoń & Axel Cleeremans - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):212-220.
    Here, we explore the sensitivity of different awareness scales in revealing conscious reports on visual emotion perception. Participants were exposed to a backward masking task involving fearful faces and asked to rate their conscious awareness in perceiving emotion in facial expression using three different subjective measures: confidence ratings , with the conventional taxonomy of certainty, the perceptual awareness scale , through which participants categorize “raw” visual experience, and post-decision wagering , which involves economic categorization. Our results show that the CR (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.
    This paper compares and contrasts two conceivability arguments: the zombie argument (ZA) against physicalism, and the perfect actor argument (AA) against behaviourism. I start the paper by assuming that the arguments are of the same kind, and that AA is sound. On the basis of these two assumptions I criticize the most common philosophical suggestions in the literature today about what is wrong with ZA, and what is right in it. I end the paper by suggesting that the comparison between (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches.Anil K. Seth, Zoltán Dienes, Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard & Luiz Pessoa - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (8):314-321.
  • Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & David B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):119-39.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals.Anil K. Seth, Bernard J. Baars & David B. Edelman - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):119-139.
    The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   649 citations  
  • The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   588 citations  
  • Knowledge applied to new domains: The unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails.Ryan B. Scott & Zoltan Dienes - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):391-398.
    A common view holds that consciousness is needed for knowledge acquired in one domain to be applied in a novel domain. We present evidence for the opposite; where the transfer of knowledge is achieved only in the absence of conscious awareness. Knowledge of artificial grammars was examined where training and testing occurred in different vocabularies or modalities. In all conditions grammaticality judgments attributed to random selection showed above-chance accuracy , while those attributed to conscious decisions did not. Participants also rated (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?Kristian Sandberg, Bert Timmermans, Morten Overgaard & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):1069-1078.
    What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale , through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings , through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering , in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Measuring consciousness: Task accuracy and awareness as sigmoid functions of stimulus duration.Kristian Sandberg, Bo Martin Bibby, Bert Timmermans, Axel Cleeremans & Morten Overgaard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1659-1675.
    When consciousness is examined using subjective ratings, the extent to which processing is conscious or unconscious is often estimated by calculating task performance at the subjective threshold or by calculating the correlation between accuracy and awareness. However, both these methods have certain limitations. In the present article, we propose describing task accuracy and awareness as functions of stimulus intensity as suggested by Koch and Preuschoff . The estimated lag between the curves describes how much stimulus intensity must increase for awareness (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Two concepts of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   491 citations  
  • Expertise and the evolution of consciousness.Matt J. Rossano - 2003 - Cognition 89 (3):207-236.
  • Introspection and subliminal perception.Thomas Zoega Ramsøy & Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (1):1-23.
    Subliminal perception (SP) is today considered a well-supported theory stating that perception can occur without conscious awareness and have a significant impact on later behaviour and thought. In this article, we first present and discuss different approaches to the study of SP. In doing this, we claim that most approaches are based on a dichotomic measure of awareness. Drawing upon recent advances and discussions in the study of introspection and phenomenological psychology, we argue for both the possibility and necessity of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   103 citations  
  • Do conscious perception and unconscious processing rely on independent mechanisms? A meta-contrast study.Ziv Peremen & Dominique Lamy - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:22-32.
    There is currently no consensus regarding what measures are most valid to demonstrate perceptual processing without awareness. Likewise, whether conscious perception and unconscious processing rely on independent mechanisms or lie on a continuum remains a matter of debate. Here, we addressed these issues by comparing the time courses of subjective reports, objective discrimination performance and response priming during meta-contrast masking, under similar attentional demands. We found these to be strikingly similar, suggesting that conscious perception and unconscious processing cannot be dissociated (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The function of consciousness in multisensory integration.Terry D. Palmer & Ashley K. Ramsey - 2012 - Cognition 125 (3):353-364.
  • Optimizing subjective measures of consciousness.Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans, Kristian Sandberg & Axel Cleeremans - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):682-684.
    Dienes and Seth (2010) conclude that confidence ratings and post-decision wagering are two comparable and recommendable measures of conscious experience. In a recently submitted paper, we have however found that both methods are problematic and seem less suited to measure consciousness than a direct introspective measure. Here, we discuss the methodology and conclusions put forward by Dienes and Seth, and why we think the two experiments end up with so different recommendations.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task.Morten Overgaard, Julian Rote, Kim Mouridsen & Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):700-708.
    In a recent article, [Sergent, C. & Dehaene, S. . Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15, 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. . Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  • Confounding factors in contrastive analysis.Morten Overgaard - 2004 - Synthese 141 (2):217-31.
    Several authors within psychology, neuroscience and philosophy take for granted that standard empirical research techniques are applicable when studying consciousness. In this article, it is discussed whether one of the key methods in cognitive neuroscience – the contrastive analysis – suffers from any serious confounding when applied to the field of consciousness studies; that is to say, if there are any systematic difficulties when studying consciousness with this method that make the results untrustworthy. Through an analysis of theoretical arguments in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.
    Following arguments put forward in my book (Why red doesn’t sound like a bell: understanding the feel of consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, USA, 2011), this article takes a pragmatic, scientist’s point of view about the concepts of consciousness and “feel”, pinning down what people generally mean when they talk about these concepts, and then investigating to what extent these capacities could be implemented in non-biological machines. Although the question of “feel”, or “phenomenal consciousness” as it is called by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
    Direct download (16 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   705 citations  
  • How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation.Georg Northoff & Kristina Musholt - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):589-605.
    Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Five kinds of self-knowledge.Ulric Neisser - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):35 – 59.
    Self-knowledge is based on several different forms of information, so distinct that each one essentially establishes a different 'self. The ecological self is the self as directly perceived with respect to the immediate physical environment; the interpersonal self, also directly perceived, is established by species-specific signals of emotional rapport and communication; the extended self is based on memory and anticipation; the private self appears when we discover that our conscious experiences are exclusively our own; the conceptual self or 'self-concept' draws (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   177 citations  
  • What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
  • Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views.Alain Morin - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):358-371.
    Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Perception without awareness: Perspectives from cognitive psychology.Philip M. Merikle & Daniel Smilek - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):115-34.
  • Consciousness without a cerbral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine.Bjorn Merker - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):63-81.
    A broad range of evidence regarding the functional organization of the vertebrate brain – spanning from comparative neurology to experimental psychology and neurophysiology to clinical data – is reviewed for its bearing on conceptions of the neural organization of consciousness. A novel principle relating target selection, action selection, and motivation to one another, as a means to optimize integration for action in real time, is introduced. With its help, the principal macrosystems of the vertebrate brain can be seen to form (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   129 citations  
  • The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge.Andy D. Mealor & Zoltan Dienes - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):123-136.
    The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure , and guess responses were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Can we solve the mind-body problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
  • Confidence measurement in the light of signal detection theory.Sã©Bastien Massoni, Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
  • Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
  • The empirical basis of color perception.R. Beau Lotto & Dale Purves - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):609-629.
    Rationalizing the perceptual effects of spectral stimuli has been a major challenge in vision science for at least the last 200 years. Here we review evidence that this otherwise puzzling body of phenomenology is generated by an empirical strategy of perception in which the color an observer sees is entirely determined by the probability distribution of the possible sources of the stimulus. The rationale for this strategy in color vision, as in other visual perceptual domains, is the inherent ambiguity of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   722 citations  
  • Distinguishing three levels in explicit self-awareness.L. Legrain, A. Cleeremans & A. Destrebecqz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):578-585.
    This paper focuses on the development of explicit self-awareness in children. Mirror self-recognition has been the most popular paradigm used to assess this ability in children. Nevertheless, according to Rochat , there are, at least, three different levels of explicit self-awareness. We therefore designed three different self-recognition tasks, each corresponding to one of these levels . We observed a decrease in performance across the three tasks. This supports a developmental scale in self-awareness. Besides, the masked self-recognition performance makes it possible (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Towards a true neural stance on consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
  • Zombies and Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):306-308.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Zombies v. Materialists.Robert Kirk & J. E. R. Squires - 1974 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 48 (1):135-164.
  • The molecules of social recognition memory: Implications for social cognition, extended mind, and neuroethics.John Bickle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):468-474.
    Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to the consolidation of memories of particular conspecific (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
  • Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • The neural correlates of consciousness: New experimental approaches needed?Jakob Hohwy - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):428-438.
    It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.Marc H. Bornstein - 1980 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (2):203-206.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1997 citations  
  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2400 citations  
  • The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.