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Selective hard compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press. pp. 149-73.details
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Responsibility, Tracing, and Consequences.Andrew C. Khoury - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):187-207.details
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A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40).David Hume - 1969 - Mineola, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.details
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Freedom and Responsibility.Hilary Bok - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Allen W. Wood - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):607.details
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Freedom within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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1. Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press. pp. 1-25.details
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The objective attitude.Tamler Sommers - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.details
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Defending Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.details
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Defending hard incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.details
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A Compatibilist Account of the Epistemic Conditions on Rational Deliberation.Derk Pereboom - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):287 - 306.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.details
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A critique of Pereboom's 'four-case argument' for incompatibilism.A. R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.details
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Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard‐Liner Takes It on the Chin.Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):467-484.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility.Benjamin Matheson - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):458-480.details
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In defence of the Four-Case Argument.Benjamin Matheson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1963-1982.details
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Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Traction without Tracing: A Solution for Control‐Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Matt King - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):463-482.details
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Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives.Tomis Kapitan - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):230.details
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Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise.Sofia Jeppsson - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1225-1240.details
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Responsibility and manipulation.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):145-177.details
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The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Demetriou - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.details
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Freedom and Responsibility.J. M. Fischer - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):432-438.details
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Freedom and Responsibility.Hilary Bok - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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Moral Responsibility Without Libertarianism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):307-330.details
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Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Building better beings: a theory of moral responsibility.Manuel Vargas - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.details
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The relationship between autonomous and morally responsible agency.Michael McKenna - 2005 - In J. Stacey Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 205--34.details
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Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.details
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Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
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Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
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The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.details
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Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.details
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