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Public Goods Games in Japan

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Human Nature 19 (2):138-156 (2008)

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  1. Trust among internet traders: A behavioral economics approach.Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (1):185-202.
    Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller's morals opens the door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers' intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the interaction of social preferences and cleverly designed reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent the (...)
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  • Are experimental economists behaviorists and is behaviorism for the birds?Robert Kurzban - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):420-421.
    Methods in experimental economics are reminiscent of the methods employed by behaviorists in the first half of the twentieth century. Empirical and conceptual progress led the field of psychology away from the principles of behaviorism, and experimental economists should consider whether the criticisms leveled against behaviorists might apply equally to them.
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  • “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies.Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger, Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe & John Q. Patton - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):795-815.
    Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...)
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  • On the limitations of quasi-experiments.Terence C. Burnham & Robert Kurzban - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):818-819.
    Although provocative, the data reported in Henrich et al.'s target article suffer from limitations, including the fact that the “selfishness axiom” is not an interesting null hypothesis, and the intrinsic limitations of quasi-experimental designs, in which random assignment is impossible. True experiments, in the laboratory or in the field, will continue to be crucial for settling core issues associated with human economic behavior.
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  • The Evolution of Cooperation.Robert M. Axelrod - 1984 - Basic Books.
    The 'Evolution of Cooperation' addresses a simple yet age-old question; If living things evolve through competition, how can cooperation ever emerge? Despite the abundant evidence of cooperation all around us, there existed no purely naturalistic answer to this question until 1979, when Robert Axelrod famously ran a computer tournament featuring a standard game-theory exercise called The Prisoner's Dilemma. To everyone's surprise, the program that won the tournament, named Tit for Tat, was not only the simplest but the most "cooperative" entrant. (...)
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  • The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author.Thomas C. Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
    Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
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  • The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.Robert L. Trivers - 1971 - Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1):35-57.
    A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate -against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the system. Three instances of altruistic behavior are discussed, the evolution of which the model can explain: (1) behavior involved in cleaning symbioses; (2) warning cries in birds: and (3) human reciprocal altruism. Regarding human reciprocal altruism, it is shown that the details of the psychological system that regulates this altruism can (...)
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