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  1. Howson and Franklin on Prediction.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):329-340.
    Evidence for a hypothesis typically confirms the hypothesis more if the evidence was predicted than if it was accommodated. Or so I argued in previous papers, where I also developed an analysis of why this should be so. But this was all a mistake if Howson and Franklin (1991) are to be believed. In this paper, I show why they are not to be believed. I also identify a grain of truth that may have been dimly grasped by those Bayesians (...)
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  • The Apparent Superiority of Prediction to Accommodation as a Side Effect: A Reply to Maher.Marc Lange - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (3):575-588.
    has offered a lovely example to motivate the intuition that a successful prediction has a kind of confirmatory significance that an accommodation lacks. This paper scrutinizes Maher's example. It argues that once the example is tweaked, the intuitive difference there between prediction and accommodation disappears. This suggests that the apparent superiority of prediction to accommodation is actually a side effect of an important difference between the hypotheses that tend to arise in each case.
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  • Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery.Patrick Maher - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:273 - 285.
    A widely endorsed thesis in the philosophy of science holds that if evidence for a hypothesis was not known when the hypothesis was proposed, then that evidence confirms the hypothesis more strongly than would otherwise be the case. The thesis has been thought to be inconsistent with Bayesian confirmation theory, but the arguments offered for that view are fallacious. This paper shows how the special value of prediction can in fact be given Bayesian explanation. The explanation involves consideration of the (...)
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  • Prediction and the Periodic Table.Eric R. Scerri & John Worrall - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):407-452.
    The debate about the relative epistemic weights carried in favour of a theory by predictions of new phenomena as opposed to accommodations of already known phenomena has a long history. We readdress the issue through a detailed re-examination of a particular historical case that has often been discussed in connection with it—that of Mendeleev and the prediction by his periodic law of the three ‘new’ elements, gallium, scandium and germanium. We find little support for the standard story that these predictive (...)
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  • Against the Epistemic Value of Prediction Over Accommodation.Robin Collins - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):210-224.
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  • How Prediction Enhances Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 327--343.