We provide an ethical evaluation of the debate on managing diversity within teams and organizations between equality and business case scholars. Our core assertion is that equality and business case perspectives on diversity from an ethical reading appear stuck as they are based on two different moral perspectives that are difficult to reconcile with each other. More specifically, we point out how the arguments of equality scholars correspond with moral reasoning grounded in deontology, whereas the foundations of the business case (...) perspective are crafted by utilitarian arguments. We show that the problems associated with each diversity perspective correspond with the traditional concerns with the two moral perspectives. To resolve this stalemate position, we argue that the equality versus business case debate needs to be approached from a third, less well-known moral perspective (i.e. virtue ethics). We posit that a focus on virtues can enhance equality by reducing prejudice and illustrate this by applying it to the HRM domains of recruitment and selection and of performance management. Subsequently, we argue that values are key to aligning virtues with each other and with corporate strategy, delineate our values and virtues perspective on diversity, and argue why and how it can enhance organizational performance. (shrink)

This investigation is motivated by the lack of scholarship examining the content of what firms are communicating to various stakeholders about their commitment to socially responsible behaviors. To address this query, a qualitative study of the legal, ethical and moral statements available on the websites of Forbes Magazine''s top 50 U.S. and top 50 multinational firms of non-U.S. origin were analyzed within the context of stakeholder theory. The results are presented thematically, and the close provides implications for social responsibility among (...) managers of global organizations as well as researchers interested in business ethics. (shrink)

Cosmopolitans argue that the account of human rights and distributive justice in John Rawls's The Law of Peoples is incompatible with his argument for liberal justice. Rawls should extend his account of liberal basic liberties and the guarantees of distributive justice to apply to the world at large. This essay defends Rawls's grounding of political justice in social cooperation. The Law of Peoples is drawn up to provide principles of foreign policy for liberal peoples. Human rights are among the necessary (...) conditions for social cooperation, and so long as a decent people respect human rights, a common good, and the Law of Peoples, it is not the role of liberal peoples to impose upon well-ordered decent peoples liberal liberties they cannot endorse. Moreover, the difference principle is not an allocative or alleviatory principle, but applies to design property and other basic social institutions necessary to economic production, exchange and consumption. It presupposes political cooperation—a legislative body to actively apply it, and a legal system to apply it to. There is no feasible global state or global legal system that could serve these roles. Finally, the difference principle embodies a conception of democratic reciprocity that is only appropriate to cooperation among free and equal citizens who are socially productive and politically autonomous. a Footnotesa I am grateful to K. C. Tan for many helpful discussions and criticisms of this essay. I am also grateful to the other contributors to this volume for their comments, and to Ellen Paul for her many helpful suggestions in preparing the final version of this essay. (shrink)

This article examines whether and how the participation of women in the firm’s board of directors and senior management enhances financial performance. We use the Fama and French (1992, 1993) valuation framework to take the level of risk into consideration, when comparing firm performances, whereas previous studies used either raw stock returns or accounting ratios. Our results indicate that firms operating in complex environments do generate positive and significant abnormal returns when they have a high proportion of women officers. Although (...) the participation of women as directors does not seem to make a difference in this regard, firms with a high proportion of women in both their management and governance systems generate enough value to keep up with normal stock-market returns. These findings tend to support the policies currently being discussed or implemented in some countries and organizations to foster the advancement of women in business. (shrink)

This paper uses social network analysis to examine the interaction between corporate blogs devoted to sustainability issues and the blogosphere, a clustered online network of collaborative actors. By analyzing the structural embeddedness of a prototypical blog in a virtual community, we show the potential of online platforms to document corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and to engage with an increasingly socially and ecologically aware stakeholder base. The results of this study show that stakeholder involvement via sustainability blogs is a valuable (...) new practice for CSR communications and stakeholder engagement. It also opens new horizons for communicating CSR issues to key constituencies online. (shrink)

This paper argues that Rawls’ principles of justice provide a normative foundation for stakeholder theory. The principles articulate (at an abstract level) citizens’ rights; these rights create interests across all aspects of society, including in the space of economic activity; and therefore, stakeholders – as citizens – have legitimate interests in the space of economic activity. This approach to stakeholder theory suggests a political interpretation of Boatright’s Moral Market approach, one that emphasizes the rights/place of citizens. And this approach to (...) stakeholder theory – in terms of citizens – raises a further question, what rights and obligations do economic agents have, beyond those attached to their roles as citizens? Rawls would reject additional rights and obligations of this sort for two reasons, one tied to freedom and one tied to pluralism. Rawls’ work therefore presses us to re-conceptualize the place of ethical claims in the economic context. (shrink)

In the first part of this essay (Beckley, 1985) I argued that Christians advocating policies for distributive justice face a dilemma when they simultaneously attempt to be faithful to Christian beliefs and values and respect the liberty of those who do not share their beliefs and values. The dilemma arises if we are morally opposed to enforcing our distinctive morality upon others and yet are unwilling to compromise our beliefs and values in order to accommodate agreement on a conception of (...) justice. A resolution to this dilemma is possible only if, on the basis of their beliefs and values, Christians can embrace general beliefs which justify obligating all persons to a system of distributive justice. I further argued that John Rawls's idea of justice as fairness, as embodied in his fair contract situation, provides a potential basis for resolving this dilemma. Rawls's contract theory is helpful because it justifies a conception of justice on the basis of the general and shared beliefs that persons are free, rational, and equal without ignoring the distinctive beliefs and moralities persons also hold. In this way Rawls intends to justify universal obligation to a system of justice without obtaining full agreement on the good or all other moral values and principles. The question remains: Can Christians, on the basis of their distinctive beliefs and values, affirm Rawls's moral beliefs that persons are free, rational, and equal? If so, Rawls's idea of justice as fairness and the original position which mediates it can provide the grounds for justifying a conception of justice that obligates all, including Christians, without compromising the distinctive features of Christian morality. In this part of the essay I shall argue that the ethical implications of the ideal of Christian love, i.e., uncompromised to accommodate agreement with others, requires that Christians affirm something like the perspective of justice as fairness. I shall first explain why I select love, and more specifically Gene Outka's understanding of love as equal regard, as the basis for arguing that Christians should affirm the idea of justice as fairness. I shall then argue that love as equal regard affirms each of the beliefs that underlie Rawls's original position, even though Christian love requires more than justice. In the second section I shall consider how my argument for justice as fairness is incomplete, limits upon the moral issues to which it is applicable, and what I claim to have achieved in this two part essay. (shrink)