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  1. Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-deception, and Self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
    The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.
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  • XII*—Rationality and Irrationality.David Charles - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83 (1):191-212.
    David Charles; XII*—Rationality and Irrationality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 191–212, https://doi.org/10.1.
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  • Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.
    My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in this view is the belief that (...)
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  • Plato, Hare and Davidson on akrasia.C. C. W. Taylor - 1980 - Mind 89 (356):499-518.
    Davidson poses the problem via three propositions p1-P3, Each persuasive but apparently inconsistent. His solution, That the three are consistent, Merely re-Phrases the problem. We should rather reject p2; if an agent judges that it would be better to do "x" than to do "y", Then he wants to do "x" more than he wants to do "y". Plato accepts p2 because he thinks all agents predominantly self-Interested, And hare because he thinks that evaluative judgments imply desires; both are criticized. (...)
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  • Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.[author unknown] - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (16):440-444.
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  • Proceedings of the Aristotelian society. [REVIEW][author unknown] - 1905 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 60:326.
     
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  • Two faces of intention.Michael Bratman - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
  • Practical reasoning and weakness of the will.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Noûs 13 (2):153-171.
    In a case of weak-willed action the agent acts-freely, deliberately, and for a reason-in a way contrary to his best judgment, even though he thinks he could act in accordance with his best judgment. The possibility of such actions has posed one problem in moral philosophy, the exact nature of the problem it poses another. In this essay I offer an answer to the latter problem: an explanation of why a plausible account of free, deliberate and purposive action seems to (...)
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  • Plato Hare and Davidson on Akrasia.C. C. W. Taylor - 1980 - Blackwell].
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  • How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.
    D. In doing x an agent acts incontinently if and only if: 1) the agent does x intentionally; 2) the agent believes there is an alternative action y open to him; and 3) the agent judges that, all things considered, it would be better to do y than to do x.
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  • Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Ethics 95 (4):943-945.
     
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  • Motivated Irrationality.David Pears - 1985 - Philosophy 60 (232):274-275.
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  • Intention and akrasia.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press. pp. 69.
     
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  • Davidson on 'Weakness of the Will'.H. Paul Grice & Judith Baker - 1985 - In Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. pp. 27--49.