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  1. Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm.Frances Kamm - 2007 - New York ;Oxford University Press.
    In Intricate Ethics, Kamm questions the moral importance of some non-consequentialist distinctions and then introduces and argues for the moral importance of ...
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  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
    Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.
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  • Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.
    Commonsense Consequentialism is a book about morality, rationality, and the interconnections between the two. In it, Douglas W. Portmore defends a version of consequentialism that both comports with our commonsense moral intuitions and shares with other consequentialist theories the same compelling teleological conception of practical reasons. Broadly construed, consequentialism is the view that an act's deontic status is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. Portmore argues that outcomes should be (...)
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  • Moral Dilemmas.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1988 - Blackwell.
    A strong tradition in philosophy denies the possibility of moral dilemmas. Recently, several philosophers reversed this tradition. In this dissertation, I clarify some fundamental issues in this debate, argue for the possibility of moral dilemmas, and determine some implications of this possibility. ;In chapter I, I define moral dilemmas roughly as situations where an agent morally ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. Moral dilemmas are resolvable if and only if one of the moral oughts overrides (...)
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • Against Conditional Obligation.Daniel Bonevac - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):37-53.
    The crucial feature of obligation sentences to which the puzzles point is that such sentences, and evaluative sentences more generally, are defeasible. They may be warranted, given some information, only to be defeated by further information. A theory that recognizes this no longer needs to see conditional obligation as anything more than a simple combination of unary obligation and the conditional.
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  • The Numbers Problem.Nien-hê Hsieh, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman - 2006 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 (4):352-372.
  • Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The Few.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):413-427.
    You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival (...)
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  • Is Agent-Neutral Deontology Possible?Matthew Hammerton - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):319-324.
    It is commonly held that all deontological moral theories are agent-relative in the sense that they give each agent a special concern that she does not perform acts of a certain type rather than a general concern with the actions of all agents. Recently, Tom Dougherty has challenged this orthodoxy by arguing that agent-neutral deontology is possible. In this article I counter Dougherty's arguments and show that agent-neutral deontology is not possible.
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  • Comments on Douglas Portmore’s Commonsense Consequentialism.Paul Hurley - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):225-232.
  • Numbers, with and Without Contractualism.Joseph Raz - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):346–367.
  • Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Louise - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518–536.
    Does the real difference between non-consequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Non-consequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ('honouring' rather than 'promoting'). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honouring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of non-consequentialist theories can only (...)
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  • Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
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  • Structures of Normative Theories.James Dreier - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
    Normative theorists like to divide normative theories into classes. One special point of focus has been to place utilitarianism into a larger class of theories which do not necessarily share its view about what is alone of impersonal intrinsic value, namely, individual human well-being, but do share another structural feature, roughly its demand that each person seek to maximize the realization of what is of impersonal intrinsic value. The larger class is distinguished from its complement in two apparently different ways. (...)
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  • Should the Numbers Count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
  • The Intrapersonal Paradox of Deontology.Christa M. Johnson - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (3):279-301.
    In response to the so-called “paradox of deontology,” many have argued that the agent-relativity of deontological constraints accounts for why an agent may not kill one in order to prevent five others from being killed. Constraints provide reasons for particular agents not to kill, not reasons to minimize overall killings. In this paper, I tease out the significance of an underappreciated aspect of this agent-relative position, i.e. it provides no guidance as to what an agent ought to do when faced (...)
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  • Rights and Agency.Amartya Sen - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1):3-39.
    This paper is about three distinct but interrelated problems: (1) the role 0f rights in moral theory, (2) thc characterization 0f agent relative values and their admissibility in consequ<—:ncc—bascd evaluation, and ( 3) the nature 0f moral evaluation 0f states 0f aihirs.
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  • Teleology, Agent‐Relative Value, and 'Good'.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):265-000.
    It is now generally understood that constraints play an important role in commonsense moral thinking and generally accepted that they cannot be accommodated by ordinary, traditional consequentialism. Some have seen this as the most conclusive evidence that consequentialism is hopelessly wrong,1 while others have seen it as the most conclusive evidence that moral common sense is hopelessly paradoxical.2 Fortunately, or so it is widely thought, in the last twenty-five years a new research program, that of Agent-Relative Teleology, has come to (...)
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  • Are Deontological Constraints Irrational?Michael Otsuka - 2011 - In Ralf Bader & John Meadowcroft (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press. pp. 38-58.
    Most deontologists find bedrock in the Pauline doctrine that it is morally objectionable to do evil in order that good will come of it. Uncontroversially, this doctrine condemns the killing of an innocent person simply in order to maximize the sum total of happiness. It rules out the conscription of a worker to his or her certain death in order to repair a fault that is interfering with the live broadcast of a World Cup match that a billion spectators have (...)
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  • Agent-Neutral Deontology.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View.
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  • The Numbers Should Count.Gregory S. Kavka - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (3):285 - 294.
  • Moral Dilemmas.Earl Conee & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):460.
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  • The Individualist Lottery: How People Count, but Not Their Numbers.J. Timmermann - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):106-112.
  • The Individualist Lottery: How People Count, but Not Their Numbers.Jens Timmermann - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):106–112.
  • Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella.Jennie Lousie - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):518-536.
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  • Neutral and Relative Value After Moore.Michael Smith - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):576-598.
  • Saving the Greater Number Without Combining Claims.Iwao Hirose - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):341–342.
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  • Saving the Greater Number Without Combining Claims.I. Hirose - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):341-342.
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  • Contractualism on Saving the Many.R. Kumar - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):165-170.