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  1. Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Bruce Brower - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (2):267.
    The notion that some things have intrinsic value, independently of whether they are valued or would be valued under certain conditions, is puzzling not only to noncognitivists and skeptics, but to theorists who understand value in terms of what would be accepted by rational preference, in a social contract, or under conditions of vivid imagination. Written in the tradition of Roderick Chisholm’s Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Noah Lemos’s Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant is unlikely to diminish the puzzlement, though it (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
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  • Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time.John Broome - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This study uses techniques from economics to illuminate fundamental questions in ethics, particularly in the foundations of utilitarianism. Topics considered include the nature of teleological ethics, the foundations of decision theory, the value of equality and the moral significance of a person's continuing identity through time.
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  • The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2001 - Rowman & Littlefield.
    At the heart of ethics reside the concepts of good and bad; they are at work when we assess whether a person is virtuous or vicious, an act right or wrong, a decision defensible or indefensible, a goal desirable or undesirable. But there are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lie intrinsic goodness and badness, the sort of value that something has for its own sake. It is in virtue of intrinsic value that other types of value (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
    First published in 1903, this volume revolutionized philosophy and forever altered the direction of ethical studies. A philosopher’s philosopher, G. E. Moore was the idol of the Bloomsbury group, and Lytton Strachey declared that Principia Ethica marked the rebirth of the Age of Reason. This work clarifies some of moral philosophy’s most common confusions and redefines the science’s terminology. Six chapters explore: the subject matter of ethics, naturalistic ethics, hedonism, metaphysical ethics, ethics in relation to conduct, and the ideal. Moore's (...)
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  • Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Noah M. Lemos - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence (...)
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  • Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
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  • Brentano and Intrinsic Value.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
    Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about (...)
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  • Extrinsic Properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
  • Objective and Unconditioned Value.Rae Langton - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):157-185.
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  • Brown and Moore's Value Invariabilism Vs Dancy's Variabilism.Guy Fletcher - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168.
    Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.
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  • Extrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):109-126.
  • A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Holism About Values.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):456–463.
    I compare two kinds of holism about values: G.E. Moore's 'organic unities', and Jonathan Dancy's 'value holism'. I propose a simple formal model for representing evaluations of parts and wholes. I then define two conditions, additivism and invariabilism, which together imply a third, atomism. Since atomism is absurd, we must reject one of the former two conditions. This is where Moore and Dancy part company: whereas Moore rejects additivism, Dancy rejects invariabilism. I argue that Moore's view is more plausible. Invariabilism (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Organic Unity.Thomas Hurka - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):299-320.
    This paper distinguishes two interpretations of G. E. Moore''s principle of organic unities, which says that the intrinsic value of a whole need not equal the sum of the intrinsic values its parts would have outside it. A holistic interpretation, which was Moore''s own, says that parts retain their values when they enter a whole but that there can be an additional value in the whole as a whole that must be added to them. The conditionality interpretation, which has been (...)
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  • Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?Ben Bradley - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.
    Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.
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  • Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
  • Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
    An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.
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  • A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Springer. pp. 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely (...)
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  • Are There Organic Unities?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
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  • Virtual Intrinsic Value and the Principle of Organic Unities.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):653-666.
    This paper argues that Moore's principle of organic unities is false. Advocates of the principle have failed to take note of the distinction between actual intrinsic value and virtual intrinsic value. Purported cases of organic unities, where the actual intrinsic value of a part of a whole is allegedly defeated by the actual intrinsic value of the whole itself, are more plausibly seen as cases where the part in question has no actual intrinsic value but instead a plurality of merely (...)
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  • Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Thomas L. Carson & Paul K. Moser (eds.), Morality and the Good Life. Oup Usa.
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  • Are There Organic Unities?Jonathan Dancy - unknown
  • II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33-51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  • Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object''s intrinsic value may sometimes depend (in part) on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast (...)
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  • Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value.Ben Bradley - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111-130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians (...)
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  • The Consistency of Qualitative Hedonism and the Value of (at Least Some) Malicious Pleasures.Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (4):462-471.
    In this article, I examine two of the standard objections to forms of value hedonism. The first is the common claim, most famously made by Bradley and Moore, that Mill's qualitative hedonism is inconsistent. The second is the apparent problem for quantitative hedonism in dealing with malicious pleasures. I argue that qualitative hedonism is consistent, even if it is implausible on other grounds. I then go on to show how our intuitions about malicious pleasure might be misleading.
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  • Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), The Journal of Ethics. Springer. pp. 97--114.
    According to the dominant philosophical tradition, intrinsic value must depend solely upon intrinsic properties. By appealing to various examples, however, I argue that we should at least leave open the possibility that in some cases intrinsic value may be based in part on relational properties. Indeed, I argue that we should even be open to the possibility that an object's intrinsic value may sometimes depend on its instrumental value. If this is right, of course, then the traditional contrast between intrinsic (...)
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  • A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni R.?Nnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33 - 51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  • The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Michael Zimmerman - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):492-494.
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