Two texts that raise problems for Alexander of Aphrodisias' theory of universals are examined. "De anima" 90.2-8 appears to suggest that universals are dependent on thought for their existence; this raises questions about the status both of universals and of forms. It is suggested that the passage is best interpreted as indicating that universals are dependent on thought only for their being recognised as universals. The last sentence of "Quaestio" 1.11 seems to assert that if the universal did not exist (...) no individual would exist, thereby contradicting Alexander's position elsewhere. This seems to be a slip resulting from the fact that species with only one member are the exception rather than the rule. (shrink)

In his De anima, Alexander of Aphrodisias identifies the active intellect with the first mover and describes this “first cause” as an immaterial and separate form. In this article, we try to explain the differences between Aristotle and Alexander on this point. Aristotle never defines the first mover as a form but claims that its being is actuality. How is it possible for Alexander, well known for being “the Commentator par excellence”, to assert such a thesis which seems dangerously close (...) to platonism ? We want to show that this description of first mover as a pure face (eidos) is not accidental in Alexander's work and is linked up with his epistemological conceptions as much as his metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the origins of the ‘problem of universals’. I argue that the problem has come to be badly formulated and that consideration of it has been impeded by falsely supposing that Platonic Forms were ever intended as an alternative to Aristotelian universals. In fact, the role that Forms are supposed by Plato to fulfill is independent of the function of a universal. I briefly consider the gradual mutation of the problem in the Academy, in Alexander of (...) Aphrodisias, and among some of the major Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, including Porphyry and Boethius. (shrink)

La physique stoïcienne est plus un corporatisme qu'un matérialisme. Est corps tout ce qui est capable d'action ou de passion. En face du mixte actif qu'est le pneuma, ce que l'on appelle matière a pour caractères l'absence de forme et de qualité, l'immobilité et l'inertie ; cette matière fonctionne cependant comme support de qualités, d'où son assimilation fréquente à la fonction hypokeimenon qui est un des aspects de la première « catégorie » stoïcienne. Ce couple agent/patient se retrouve à différentes (...) étapes de la physique stoïcienne, notamment dans le diakosmèsis, et dans son redoublement réflexif : les deux principes de la physique. L'analyse des deux principes met en évidence le dédoublement de la notion de corps : le corps comme capacité d'agir ou de pâtir et le corps comme solide. Stoic physics is more corporalism than materialism. A body is everything capable of action or passion. In front of active pneuma, matter is formless, deprived of qualities, motionless and passive ; but, this matter acts as a support of qualities hence it is frequently identified with hypokeimenon, an aspect of the first stoic category. The pair action/passion is repeated at different stages of stoic physics, particularly in the diakosmèsis and its reflexive duplication ; the two principles of physics. The analysis of those two principles shows the splitting in two of the notion of body : the body as capacity of action or passion and the body as solid. (shrink)