Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. [REVIEW]Mirek Janusz - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):296-300.
    This book makes a significant contribution to the standard decision theory, that is, the theory of choice built around the principle of maximizing expected utility, both to its causal version and to the more traditional noncausal approach. The author’s success in clarifying the foundations of the standard decision theory in general, and causal decision theory in particular, also makes the book uniquely suitable for a person whose research in philosophy has led her to want to learn about contemporary decision theory. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • Weighing Lives.John Broome - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    We are often faced with choices that involve the weighing of people's lives against each other, or the weighing of lives against other good things. These are choices both for individuals and for societies. A person who is terminally ill may have to choose between palliative care and more aggressive treatment, which will give her a longer life but at some cost in suffering. We have to choose between the convenience to ourselves of road and air travel, and the lives (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Ethics Out of Economics.John Broome - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    Many economic problems are also ethical problems: should we value economic equality? how much should we care about preserving the environment? how should medical resources be divided between saving life and enhancing life? This book examines some of the practical issues that lie between economics and ethics, and shows how utility theory can contribute to ethics. John Broome's work has, unusually, combined sophisticated economic and philosophical expertise, and Ethics Out of Economics brings together some of his most important essays, augmented (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • A Money-Pump for Acyclic Intransitive Preferences.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):251-257.
    The standard argument for the claim that rational preferences are transitive is the pragmatic money-pump argument. However, a money-pump only exploits agents with cyclic strict preferences. In order to pump agents who violate transitivity but without a cycle of strict preferences, one needs to somehow induce such a cycle. Methods for inducing cycles of strict preferences from non-cyclic violations of transitivity have been proposed in the literature, based either on offering the agent small monetary transaction premiums or on multi-dimensional preferences. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • I—I Ncommensurability and V Agueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
    This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the 'fitting attitudes' analysis of value.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I.Donald Davidson, J. C. C. McKinsey & Patrick Suppes - 1955 - Philosophy of Science 22 (2):140-160.
    Contemporary philosophers interested in value theory appear to be largely concerned with questions of the following sort:What is value?What is the meaning of the word ‘good’?Does the attribution of value to an object have a cognitive, or merely an emotive, significance?The first question is metaphysical; to ask it is analogous to asking in physics:What is matter?What is electricity?The others are generally treated as semantical questions; to ask them is analogous to asking in statistics:What is the meaning of the word ‘probable’?Does (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Options and Diachronic Tragedy.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued.Erik Carlson - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):171-174.
    Gustafsson and Espinoza have recently argued that the ‘small-improvement argument’, against completeness as a rationality requirement for preference orderings, is defective. They claim that the two main premises of the argument conflict, and hence should not both be accepted. I show that this conflict can be avoided by modifying one of the premises.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk.Martin Peterson - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
    Consequentialism, one of the major theories of normative ethics, maintains that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely by the act's consequences and its alternatives. The traditional form of consequentialism is one-dimensional, in that the rightness of an act is a function of a single moral aspect, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces. In this book Martin Peterson introduces a new type of consequentialist theory: multidimensional consequentialism. According to this theory, an act's moral rightness depends (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Harvard University Press.
    Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? In this book, some of the sharpest minds in philosophy struggle with these questions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   331 citations  
  • On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   667 citations  
  • Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a major contribution to the theory of rational choice which will be of particular interest to philosophers and economists. The author sets out the foundations of rational choice, and then sketches a dynamic choice framework in which principles of ordering and independence follow from a number of apparently plausible conditions. However, there is potential conflict among these conditions, and when they are weakened to avoid it the usual foundations of rational choice no longer prevail. The thrust of the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   144 citations  
  • Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this book, first published in 2000, Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   163 citations  
  • Moral Dilemmas and Incomparability.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1985 - American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (4):321 - 329.
    The author defines moral dilemmas as situations where there is a moral requirement for an agent to adopt each of two alternatives, And the agent cannot adopt both, But neither moral requirement overrides the other. The author then argues that moral dilemmas are possible because conflicting moral requirements can be either symmetrical or incomparable in a way that is limited enough to be plausible but still strong enough to yield moral dilemmas.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as 'Trumped' (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), 'Rouble trouble' (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), 'The airtight Dutch book' (McGee 1999), and 'The two envelopes puzzle' (Broome 1995). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
    An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • To Have One's Cake and Eat It, Too: Sequential Choice and Expected-Utility Violations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620.
  • The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):460–464.
    The money-pump argument is the standard argument for the acyclicity of rational preferences. The argument purports to show that agents with cyclic preferences are in some possible situations forced to act against their preference. In the usual, diachronic version of the money-pump argument, such agents accept a series of trades that leaves them worse off than before. Two stock objections are (i) that one may get the drift and refuse the trades and (ii) that one may adopt a plan to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   573 citations  
  • The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
    This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   214 citations  
  • Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press.
  • Money Pump with Foresight.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - In Michael J. Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits. pp. 123-154.
    I describe in section 1 how cyclical preferences can arise. In section 2, I relate preference to judgments of choiceworthiness and distinguish between two kinds of preference cycles, vicious and benign. In section 3, I run through the standard money pump in order to show, in section 4, how this pump can be stopped by foresight, using backward induction. A new money pump that *cannot* be stopped by foresight is presented in section 5. This pump works even for agents with (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • VII—Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1):117-134.
    Part I defines the notion, Distinguishing between it an equality of value, And analysing some of the sources of incommensurability. Part ii argues that not only the roughly equal can be incommensurate, And for the possibility of significant incommensurabilities. Part iii argues that the common denial of the comparability of various options provides sufficient evidence that they are so.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice.Robert Nozick - 1969 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Reidel. pp. 114--146.
  • Intransitivity and Vague Preferences.Jonathan Aldred - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):377-403.
    This paper is concerned with intransitivity in normative rational choice. It focuses on a class of intransitivities which have received little attention, those involving vague preferences. “Vague preferences” are defined in terms of vague predicates such as “red” or “bald.” Such preferences appear common, and intransitive indifference is argued to be an unavoidable feature of them. Such preferences are argued to undermine intransitive strict preference also. Various formal theories of vagueness are applied to an example of vague preferences, but none (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Good and the True.Ronald B. De Sousa - 1974 - Mind 83:534.
  • Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism.Krister Bykvist - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (1):27.
    Act-consequentialism is usually taken to be the view that we ought to perform the act that will have the best consequences. But this definition ignores the possibility of various non-maximizing forms of act-consequentialism, e.g. satisficing theories that tell us to perform the act whose consequences will be good enough. What seems crucial to act-consequentialism is not that we ought to maximize value but that the normative status of alternative actions depends solely on the values of their outcomes. The purpose of (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (4):433-445.
    In this article, I argue that the small-improvement argument fails since some of the comparisons involved in the argument might be indeterminate. I defend this view from two objections by Ruth Chang, namely the argument from phenomenology and the argument from perplexity. There are some other objections to the small-improvement argument that also hinge on claims about indeterminacy. John Broome argues that alleged cases of value incomparability are merely examples of indeterminacy in the betterness relation. The main premise of his (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Parity, Clumpiness and Rational Choice.Martin Peterson - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (4):505-513.
    Some philosophers believe that two objects of value can be ‘roughly equal’, or ‘on a par’, or belong to the same ‘clump’ of value in a sense that is fundamentally different from that in which some objects are ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, or ‘equally as good as’ others. This article shows that if two objects are on a par, or belong to the same clump, then an agent accepting a few plausible premises can be exploited in a money-pump. The central (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Intransitivity of Preferences.Amos Tversky - 1969 - Psychological Review 76 (1):31-48.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   150 citations  
  • The Theory of Statistical Decision.Leonard J. Savage - 1951 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 46:55--67.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations