Amartya Sen; XII*—Plural Utility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 193–216, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/.

J s mill's principle of liberty is often thought to say that the only good reason for interfering with a person's conduct is that it is harmful to others. An alternative interpretation is defended: that the only good reason for interfering is to prevent harm to others. Harm-Prevention is the aim, But the latter principle allows that conduct affected not be harmful; interference must be calculated to prevent harm to others, Perhaps indirectly. This accords with mill's official statement of his (...) principle, Accommodates his own otherwise troublesome examples of cooperation and good samaritan requirements, And fits as well with the texts. (shrink)

In mill the principle of utility does not ascribe rightness or wrongness to anything. It governs not just morality but the whole art of life. It says that happiness is the only thing desirable as an end. But the meaning of this formulation is problematic, Since mill's theory of practical reason conceives this desirability as an end as generating reasons for action for all agents in a way implying impartiality between self and others, Whereas in the ordinary sense it does (...) not. This interpretation is supported by detailed textual analysis. (shrink)