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  1. Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.
    Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...)
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  • On Fitelson's measure of coherence.Mark Siebel - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):189–190.
  • On Fitelson's measure of coherence.M. Siebel - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):189-190.
  • Reply to Akiba on the probabilistic measure of coherence.Tomoji Shogenji - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):147–150.
  • Reply to Akiba on the probabilistic measure of coherence.T. Shogenji - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):147-150.
  • Is coherence truth conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
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  • Is coherence truth conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
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  • Why coherence is not truth-conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236-241.
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  • Why coherence is not truth-conducive.Erik J. Olsson - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):236–241.
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  • Degree of Factual Support.John G. Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (2):190-190.
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  • Degree of factual support.John G. Kemeny & Paul Oppenheim - 1952 - Philosophy of Science 19 (4):307-324.
    We wish to give a precise formulation of the intuitive concept: The degree to which the known facts support a given hypothesis.
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  • A probabilistic theory of coherence.B. Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194-199.
  • A probabilistic theory of coherence.Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194–199.
    Let E be a set of n propositions E1, ..., En. We seek a probabilistic measure C(E) of the ‘degree of coherence’ of E. Intuitively, we want C to be a quantitative, probabilistic generalization of the (deductive) logical coherence of E. So, in particular, we require C to satisfy the following..
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  • Coherentism, reliability and bayesian networks.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):685-719.
    The coherentist theory of justification provides a response to the sceptical challenge: even though the independent processes by which we gather information about the world may be of dubious quality, the internal coherence of the information provides the justification for our empirical beliefs. This central canon of the coherence theory of justification is tested within the framework of Bayesian networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. We interpret the independence of the information gathering processes (IGPs) in (...)
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  • Shogenji's probabilistic measure of coherence is incoherent.Ken Akiba - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):356–359.
  • Shogenji's probabilistic measure of coherence is incoherent.K. Akiba - 2000 - Analysis 60 (4):356-359.
  • What is the problem of coherence and truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.