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  1. The Suberogatory.Julia Driver - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):286 – 295.
  • Neuroethics.Adina Roskies - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Moral Saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.
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  • The Right to Privacy.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4):295-314.
  • Prejudice in Jest: When Racial and Gender Humor Harms.David Benatar - 1999 - Public Affairs Quarterly 13 (2):191-203.
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  • What Is the Right to Privacy?Andrei Marmor - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (1):3-26.
  • Concealment and Exposure.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1):3-30.
    Everyone knows that something has gone wrong, in the United States, with the conventions of privacy. Along with a vastly increased tolerance for variation in sexual life we have seen a sharp increase in prurient and censorious attention to the sexual lives of public figures and famous persons, past and present. The culture seems to be growing more tolerant and more intolerant at the same time, though perhaps different parts of it are involved in the two movements.
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  • Brain Privacy and the Case of Cannibal Cop.Mark Tunick - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (2):179-196.
    In light of technology that may reveal the content of a person’s innermost thoughts, I address the question of whether there is a right to ‘brain privacy’—a right not to have one’s inner thoughts revealed to others–even if exposing these thoughts might be beneficial to society. I draw on a conception of privacy as the ability to control who has access to information about oneself and to an account that connects one’s interest in privacy to one’s interests in autonomy and (...)
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  • The Varieties of Retributive Experience.Christopher Bennett - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):145-163.
    Retribution is often dismissed as augmenting the initial harm done, rather than ameliorating it. This criticism rests on a crude view of retribution. In our actual practice in informal situations and in the workings of the reactive (properly called 'retributive') sentiments, retribution is true to the gravity of wrongdoing, but does aim to ameliorate it. Through wrongdoing, offenders become alienated from the moral community: their actions place their commitment to its core values in doubt. We recognize this status in blaming, (...)
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  • Privacy and Punishment.Mark Tunick - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (4):643-668.
    Philosophers have focused on why privacy is of value to innocent people with nothing to hide. I argue that for people who do have something to hide, such as a past crime, or bad behavior in a public place, informational privacy can be important for avoiding undeserved or disproportionate non-legal punishment. Against the objection that one cannot expect privacy in public facts, I argue that I might have a legitimate privacy interest in public facts that are not readily accessible, or (...)
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  • Racist Acts and Racist Humor.Michael Philips - 1984 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):75-96.
    Racist jokes are often funny. And part of this has to do with their racism. Many Polish jokes, for example, may easily be converted into moron jokes but are not at all funny when delivered as such. Consider two answers to ‘What has an I.Q. of 1007’: a nation of morons; or Poland. Similarly, jokes portraying Jews as cheap, Italians as cowards, and Greeks as dishonest may be told as jokes about how skinflints, cowards, or dishonest people get on in (...)
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  • Feminism, Democracy and the Right to Privacy.Annabelle Lever - 2005 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 9 (1).
    This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of solitude, intimacy and confidentiality and shows that, so described, people have legitimate interests in privacy. These interests are both personal and political, and provide the grounds for two different justifications of privacy rights. Though both are based on democratic concerns for the freedom and equality of individuals, these two justifications for privacy (...)
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  • Revisiting the Right to Do Wrong.Renee Jorgensen Bolinger - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):43-57.
    Rights to do wrong are not necessary even within the framework of interest-based rights aimed at preserving autonomy. Agents can make morally significant choices and develop their moral character without a right to do wrong, so long as we allow that there can be moral variation within the set of actions that an agent is permitted to perform. Agents can also engage in non-trivial self-constitution in choosing between morally indifferent options, so long as there is adequate non-moral variation among the (...)
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  • A Right to Do Wrong.Jeremy Waldron - 1981 - Ethics 92 (1):21-39.
  • Defending the Right To Do Wrong.Ori J. Herstein - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (3):343-365.
    Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a right) to do wrong is a condition (...)
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  • Moral Saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Right to Do Wrong.Gerhard Øverland - 2007 - Law and Philosophy 26 (4):377-404.
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  • On the Alleged Right to Do Wrong: A Response to Waldron.William A. Galston - 1982 - Ethics 93 (2):320-324.
  • Why Privacy is Important.James Rachels - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4):323-333.
  • Feminism, Democracy and the Right to Privacy.Annabelle Lever - 2005 - Minerva 2005 (nov):1-31.
    This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...)
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  • Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal Evidence.Annabelle Lever - 2000 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 67:1137-1172.
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  • Galston on Rights.Jeremy Waldron - 1982 - Ethics 93 (2):325-327.
  • Thomson on Privacy.Thomas Scanlon - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (4):315-322.
  • Privacy, Morality, and the Law.W. A. Parent - 1983 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (4):269-288.
  • Must Privacy and Sexual Equality Conflict? A Philosophical Examination of Some Legal Evidence.Annabelle Lever - 2001 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 67 (4):1137-1171.
    Are rights to privacy consistent with sexual equality? In a brief, but influential, article Catherine MacKinnon trenchantly laid out feminist criticisms of the right to privacy. In “Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade” she linked familiar objections to the right to privacy and connected them to the fate of abortion rights in the U.S.A. (MacKinnon, 1983, 93-102). For many feminists, the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) had suggested that, notwithstanding a dubious past, legal rights to privacy (...)
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