- Towards a reasonable libertarianism.David Wiggins - 1973 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action. Boston,: Routledge and Kegan Paul. pp. 31.details
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The incompatibility of freewill and determinism.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Philosophical Papers.George Edward Moore - 1959 - New York: Routledge.details
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Freedom and Responsibility.Hilary Bok - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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A contrastivist manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.details
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Proof of an External World.G. E. Moore - 1939 - H. Milford.details
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Causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible: A new argument for incompatibilism.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:167-180.details
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Causal Determinism and Human Freedom are Incompatible: A New Argument for Incompatibilism.Ted A. Warfield - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):167-180.details
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Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account.Kadri Vihvelin - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):427-450.details
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Reply to Christopher Hill.Peter van Inwagen - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):56.details
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Freedom to break the laws.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):334–350.details
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An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1998 - University of Toronto Press.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Of God and freedom: A rejoinder.Nelson Pike - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):369-379.details
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Divine omniscience and voluntary action.Nelson Pike - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):27-46.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):526-531.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Foreknowledge and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.details
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Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.David Lewis - 1979 - Noûs 13 (4):455-476.details
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Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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Skepticism and Closure.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.details
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The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.Peter Van Inwagen - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (3):185 - 199.details
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Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument.Christopher S. Hill - 1992 - Analysis 52 (2):49.details
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Epistemic conceptions of begging the question.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):343-363.details
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Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - Newport News, Va.: Vale Press.details
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On Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498-500.details
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The fixity of reasons.Andre Norman Gallois - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):233 - 248.details
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Compatibilism and the Argument from Unavoidability.Thomas P. Flint - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):423.details
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The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks.John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):97-115.details
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The Metasphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.details
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Review of John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. [REVIEW]Gideon Yaffe - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):429-434.details
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Newcomb’s problem: A reply to Carlson.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):229–236.details
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Newcomb's problem: a reply to Carlson.J. M. Fischer - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):229-236.details
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My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry. [REVIEW]John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):167 - 189.details
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My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):167-189.details
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Incompatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (1):127 - 137.details
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Freedom and miracles.John Martin Fischer - 1988 - Noûs 22 (2):235-252.details
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Critical Notice.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):427-444.details
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The mind argument and libertarianism.Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield - 1998 - Mind 107 (427):515-28.details
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VII.—Subjunctive Conditionals, Time Order, and Causation.P. B. Downing - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):125-140.details
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Fischer on backtracking and newcomb's problem.Erik Carlson - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):229–231.details
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Fischer on Backtracking and Newcomb's Problem.E. Carlson - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):229-231.details
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Reply to Brueckner.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):264-269.details
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Free will and the necessity of the past.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):105-111.details
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Free will and the necessity of the past.J. K. Campbell - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):105-111.details
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Freedom and Responsibility.Hilary Bok - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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