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  1. Who is Fooled.Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Applies and extends the conclusions of the preceding chapters by examining cases of self‐deception of a puzzling sort emerging from cases of fantasizing and imagining, found in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. The author is particularly interested in what can be described as the ‘divided mind of self‐deception’, the mind that produces an imagination due to its realising the state of the world that motivates the fantasy construct and the possessor's eventual acquisition (...)
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  • What thought requires.Donald Davidson - 2001 - In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 121.
    Examines further the criteria for attributing thought to an object or creature by illuminating the relation between thought, language, and world on the one hand, and the sort of structure that thought and language require on the other. Examines the implications the Unified Theory has with regards to this relation, and challenges the widespread belief that we will not really understand the intentional attitudes, conceptualization, or language until we can give a purely extensional, physicalist account of them.
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  • Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
  • .Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) - 1985 - Blackwell.
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  • Is Thought without Language Possible?Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2):177–191.
    In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assump-tions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inade-quacy of this notion (...)
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  • The problem of objectivity.D. Davidson - 1995 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (2):203-220.
    Since Descartes, epistemology has been based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. I shall argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner (...)
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  • Is thought without language possible?Diana I. Pérez - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):177-191.
    In this paper,1 I discuss Davidson’s ideas about the relationship between mind and language. First, I consider his arguments for the claim that there cannot be thought without language, and I examine the assumptions the arguments presuppose. In the second place, I consider the idea of “thought” Davidson adopts, and its essentially normative and holistic character. Third, I try to show the adequacy of this conception of thought in order to deal with epistemological problems, and the inadequacy of this notion (...)
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