- Exploring the proof paradoxes.Mike Redmayne - 2008 - Legal Theory 14 (4):281-309.details
|
|
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.details
|
|
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
|
|
Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Carter Adam, Gordon Emma & Jarvis Benjamin (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.details
|
|
The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):1-17.details
|
|
Legal Burdens of Proof and Statistical Evidence.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.details
|
|
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.details
|
|
The theory of probability.Hans Reichenbach - 1949 - Berkeley,: University of California Press.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):645-665.details
|
|
Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
|
|
When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
|
|
What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
|
|
Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
|
|
Extreme Betting.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Ratio 32 (1):32-41.details
|
|
Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
|
|
The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
|
|
L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
|
|
The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
|
|
The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
|
|
Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
|
|
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
|
|
Radical interpretation.David K. Lewis - 1974 - Synthese 23 (July-August):331-344.details
|
|
Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.details
|
|
The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
|
|
The Coherence Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):5-25.details
|
|
The Coherence Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):5-25.details
|
|
Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.details
|
|
Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
|
|
How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
|
|
Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
|
|
A case of radical probability estimation.M. Hammerton - 1973 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 101 (2):252.details
|
|
Working without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Fumerton & Richard Foley - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):141.details
|
|
Working without a net: a study of egocentric epistemology.Richard Foley - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
|
|
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
|
|
What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
|
|
The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.details
|
|
Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge.David Enoch, Levi Spectre & Talia Fisher - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (3):197-224.details
|
|
Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
|
|
Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
|
|
Trial by Statistics: Is a High Probability of Guilt Enough to Convict?Marcello Di Bello - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1045-1084.details
|
|
Is it a crime to belong to a reference class.Mark Colyvan, Helen M. Regan & Scott Ferson - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2):168–181.details
|
|