- Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - In James Ladyman & Don Ross (eds.), Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett & John G. Collier.details
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Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination (1981).William C. Wimsatt - 2012 - In Lena Soler (ed.), Characterizing the robustness of science: after the practice turn in philosophy of science. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 61-78.details
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The intentional stance: Developmental and neurocognitive perspectives.Richard Griffin - 2002 - In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Interdefining causation and intervention.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):175-194.details
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Interdefining Causation and Intervention.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):175-194.details
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Unlikely allies: embodied social cognition and the intentional stance.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):487-506.details
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Response to Strevens.Jim Woodward - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):193-212.details
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Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. [REVIEW]Michael Strevens - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):233-249.details
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Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation.James F. Woodward - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Review of M aking Things Happen. [REVIEW]Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):545-547.details
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Methodology, ontology, and interventionism.James Woodward - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3577-3599.details
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Interventionism and Causal Exclusion.James Woodward - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):303-347.details
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Causation in biology: Stability, specificity, and the choice of levels of explanation.James Woodward - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318.details
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A Functional Account of Causation; or, A Defense of the Legitimacy of Causal Thinking by Reference to the Only Standard That Matters—Usefulness.James Woodward - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):691-713.details
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Intentional systems theory, mental causation and empathic resonance.Marc V. P. Slors - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.details
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The Intentional Stance by Daniel Dennett. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-216.details
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Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):507 - 524.details
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Lessons from Causal Exclusion.Larry Shapiro - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):594-604.details
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Lessons from Causal Exclusion1.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):594-604.details
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What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):603-627.details
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Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment.Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David Thompson (eds.) - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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What Isn’t a Belief?Mark Richard - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):291-318.details
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Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):259-89.details
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Dennett’s Unrealistic Psychology.Georges Rey - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):259-289.details
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Causation, exclusion, and the special sciences.Panu Raatikainen - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):349-363.details
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Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):93-109.details
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A definition of physicalism.Philip Pettit - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):213-23.details
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Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism.John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.details
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Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism.Brian P. McLaughlin & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.details
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Dennett's little grains of salt.Gregory McCulloch - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.details
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Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.details
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.details
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Program explanation: a general perspective.Frank Jackson & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107.details
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Program explanation: A general perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.details
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Folk psychology is here to stay.Terence Horgan & James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.details
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Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Christopher Hitchcock & Judea Pearl - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):639.details
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When is a brain like the planet?Clark Glymour - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (3):330-347.details
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Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age.György Gergely, Zoltán Nádasdy, Gergely Csibra & Szilvia Bíró - 1995 - Cognition 56 (2):165-193.details
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Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets.Alexander Gebharter - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):353-375.details
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Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument.Markus I. Eronen - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):219-232.details
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Robustness and reality.Markus I. Eronen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3961-3977.details
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Interventionism and Supervenience: A New Problem and Provisional Solution.Markus8 Eronen & Daniel Brooks - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):185-202.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Real patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.details
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Intentional systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.details
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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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Control variables and mental causation.John Campbell - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):15-30.details
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Rendering Interventionism and Non‐Reductive Physicalism Compatible.Michael Baumgartner - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (1):1-27.details
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Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non‐reductive Physicalism.Michael Baumgartner - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):161-178.details
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