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Uniform Applicability.Matthew H. Kramer - 2009-04-10 - In Marcia Baron & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 129–151.details
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Why we reason the way we do.Nishi Shah - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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Moral Fictionalism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - 2020 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge.details
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