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The runabout inference ticket.Arthur Prior - 1967 - In P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical logic. London,: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-9.details
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Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation.Richard Threlkeld Cox - 1946 - American Journal of Physics 14 (2):1-13.details
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In defense of proper functions.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.R. Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Conditionalization and observation.Paul Teller - 1973 - Synthese 26 (2):218-258.details
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Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):856.details
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A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
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Dynamic coherence and probability kinematics.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Philosophy of Science 54 (1):1-20.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Truth and the Theory of Content.Stephen Schiffer - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding. W. de Gruyter. pp. 204-222.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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Yes and no.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.details
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The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.details
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The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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How to be a Normativist about the Nature of Belief.Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.details
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The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.details
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Must the scientist make value judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.details
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Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (3):413-424.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Entitlement and rationality.C. S. Jenkins - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):25-45.details
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Valuation and acceptance of scientific hypotheses.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-246.details
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Ethics and the logic of decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (19):528-539.details
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Accuracy and Educated Guesses.Sophie Horowitz - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.details
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Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.details
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A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
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Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.details
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Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
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Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection.Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.details
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An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.details
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Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.details
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Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.details
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