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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Judgement and justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Minimal Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 257-269.details
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The role of intuition in philosophical inquiry: An account with no unnatural ingredients.Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - In . pp. 129-141.details
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The Presidential Address: Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105:1 - 23.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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I *-armchair philosophy, metaphysical modality and counterfactual thinking.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):1-23.details
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What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.details
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Quasi-realism, negation and the Frege-Geach problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.details
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Normativity and epistemic intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.details
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How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):573-599.details
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Epistemic intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.details
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Moral facts and moral knowledge.William G. Lycan - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.details
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The evidential status of philosophical intuition.Janet Levin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):193-224.details
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The Limits of Morality.Michael Slote - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):915-917.details
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The limits of morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The A Priori Isn’t All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.details
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Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):68-89.details
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Philosophical thought experiments, intuitions, and cognitive equilibrium.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 68-89.details
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The incoherence of empiricism.George Bealer - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):99-138.details
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Intuitions as evidence.Joel Pust - 2000 - New York: Garland.details
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Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.) - 1998 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.details
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The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence.Alvin I. Goldman & Joel Pust - 1998 - In Michael Depaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium.Robert C. Cummins - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 113-128.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 201-240.details
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A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - In Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 101--112.details
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