- ‘Ought’ and Resolution Semantics.Fabrizio Cariani - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):534-558.details
|
|
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.details
|
|
Betterness of permissibility.Benjamin Ferguson & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2451-2469.details
|
|
Figures in a Probability Landscape.Bas van Fraassen - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap. Boston, MA, USA: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 345-356.details
|
|
Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 525-540.details
|
|
Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
|
|
A treatise on probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications.details
|
|
A Treatise on Probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - London,: Macmillan & co..details
|
|
Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
|
|
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
A gradable approach to dispositions.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):68–75.details
|
|
The Meaning of More.Alexis Wellwood - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
VI-BayesianExpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
|
|
Bayesian Expressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
|
|
‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.details
|
|
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.details
|
|
Précis of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.details
|
|
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.details
|
|
Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values.Jrg Williams - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):412-433.details
|
|
On Being Obliged to Act.Alan R. White - 1968 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 1:64-82.details
|
|
On Being Obliged to Act.Alan R. White - 1968 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 1:64-82.details
|
|
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Must rational intentions maximize utility?Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup2):73-92.details
|
|
The "Good" and the "Right" Revisited.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):499-519..details
|
|
I. deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.details
|
|
Deontic logic.G. H. von Wright - 1951 - Mind 60 (237):1-15.details
|
|
The Application of Constraint Semantics to the Language of Subjective Uncertainty.Eric Swanson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (2):121-146.details
|
|
`Ought' and `better'.Aaron Sloman - 1970 - Mind 79 (315):385-394.details
|
|
Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.Alex Silk - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.details
|
|
What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
|
|
Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Slaves of the passions * by mark Schroeder.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.details
|
|
Chilling out on epistemic rationality: A defense of imprecise credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.details
|
|
Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
|
|
Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory.Michael D. Resnik - 1987 - Univ of Minnesota Press.details
|
|
Engaging Reason.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):745-748.details
|
|
Incommensurability and agency.Joseph Raz - 1998 - In Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 110-28.details
|
|
Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than.Stuart Rachels - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 249--263.details
|
|
Counterexamples to the transitivity of better than.Stuart Rachels - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.details
|
|
Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.details
|
|
All or Nothing, but If Not All, Next Best or Nothing.Theron Pummer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):278-291.details
|
|
The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than.Jacob M. Nebel - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):874-899.details
|
|
Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.details
|
|
On linking dispositions and conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.details
|
|