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  1. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.Alison McIntyre - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):267.
    John Fischer and Mark Ravizza defend in this book a painstakingly constructed analysis of what they take to be a core condition of moral responsibility: the notion of guidance control. The volume usefully collects in one place ideas and arguments the authors have previously published in singly or jointly authored works on this and related topics, as well as various refinements to those views and some suggestive discussions that aim to show how their account of guidance control might fit into (...)
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  • Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
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  • Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on (...)
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  • Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:231-249.
    My question here is whether there are intentional mental actions that generate special, significant threats to causalism (i.e., threats of a kind not generated by intentional overt actions), or that generate, more poi- gnantly, problems for causalism that some intentional overt actions allegedly generate, as well.
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  • Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829.
    This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he (...)
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  • A Challenge for Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists.Philip Swenson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1279-1285.
    The principle of alternative possibilities tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP . And Frankfurt-style compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs. But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases. This tension has thus far largely been treated (...)
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  • A New Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions.Carolina Sartorio - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):460–482.
  • Agency and Mental Action.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):231-249.
    My question here is whether there are intentional mental actions that generate special, significant threats to causalism (i.e., threats of a kind not generated by intentional overt actions), or that generate, more poignantly, problems for causalism that some intentional overt actions allegedly generate, as well.
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  • Responsibility and Failure.John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:251 - 270.
  • Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.
  • Responsibility and Inevitability.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1991 - Ethics 101 (2):258-278.
  • An Alleged Asymmetry Between Actions and Omissions.Harry Frankfurt - 1994 - Ethics 104 (3):620-623.
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  • XIV—Responsibility and Failure.John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1):251-272.