Much debate has ensued regarding the challenge to scientific realism provided by consideration of certain problematic episodes of theory change in the history of science. This paper contends that there is an interesting case which has been overlooked in this debate, namely the prediction of the positron by Dirac from his ‘hole’ theory, and its subsequent replacement by a theory which failed to contain a central, and essential, theoretical posit: the ‘Dirac sea’ of negative energy electrons. Accounting for this case (...) with the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of contemporary scientific realism proves particularly troublesome, even for the structural realist. (shrink)

SUMMARYFaced with various anomalies related to nuclear physics in particular, in 1929 Niels Bohr suggested that energy might not be conserved in the atomic nucleus and the processes involving it. By this radical proposal he hoped not only to get rid of the anomalies but also saw a possibility to explain a puzzle in astrophysics, namely the energy generated by stars. Bohr repeated his suggestion of stellar energy arising ex nihilo on several occasions but without ever going into detail. In (...) fact, it is not very clear what he meant or how seriously he took the stellar energy hypothesis. This paper relates Bohr's comments to the period's attempts to find a mechanism for stellar energy and also to the role played by astrophysics at the Copenhagen institute. Moreover, it looks at how Bohr's hypothesis was received not only by physicists but also by astronomers. In this regard the disciplinary status of astrophysics and its contemporary relation to the new quantum mechanics is of relevance. It turns out that, with very few exceptions, the hypothesis was met with silence by astronomers and astrophysicists concerned with the problem of stellar energy production. And yet, for a brief period of time it did have an impact on how physicists thought about the interior of the stars. (shrink)

In this article, I consider some of the first appearances of a hypothesis of quantized energy between the years 1900 and 1913 and provide an analysis of the nature of the unificatory power of this hypothesis in a Bayesian framework. I argue that the best way to understand the unification here is in terms of informational relevance: on the assumption of the quantum hypothesis, phenomena that were previously thought to be unrelated turned out to yield information about one another on (...) the basis of agreeing measurements of the numerical value of Planck’s constant. (shrink)

Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this (...) through a recent case in paleoanthropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer’s conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer’s evidence and arguments. (shrink)