Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
    In discussions of perception and its relation to knowledge, it is common to distinguish what one comes to believe on the basis of perception from the distinctively perceptual basis of one's belief. The distinction can be drawn in terms of propositional contents: there are the contents that a perceiver comes to believe on the basis of her perception, on the one hand; and there are the contents properly attributed to perception itself, on the other. Consider the content.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   248 citations  
  • Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.
    This paper examines the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination in the light of the so-called ‘relevant alternatives’ intuition. It begins by outlining an intuitive relevant alternatives account of perceptual knowledge which incorporates the insight that there is a close connection between perceptual knowledge and the possession of relevant discriminatory abilities. It is argued, however, that in order to resolve certain problems that face this view, it is essential to recognise an important distinction between favouring and discriminating epistemic support that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   272 citations  
  • Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   669 citations  
  • Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Talbot Brewer & Robert Audi - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):433.
    It is not clear whether to assess Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character as a collection of essays or a unified piece of theorizing. Seven of the book’s twelve essays have been published before, and at first blush they appear connected by little more than a common focus on ethics. These essays are framed, however, by an introduction and conclusion characterizing the book as the elaboration of a single, large-scale ethical theory. Perhaps a comprehensive theory can be disentangled from (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations.Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.) - 2002 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Ethical Intuitionism was the dominant moral theory in Britain for much of the 18th, 19th and the first third of the twentieth century. However, during the middle decades of the twentieth century ethical intuitionism came to be regarded as utterly untenable. It was thought to be either empty, or metaphysically and epistemologically extravagant, or both. This hostility led to a neglect of the central intuitionist texts, and encouraged the growth of a caricature of intuitionism that could easily be rejected before (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The New Intuitionism.Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.) - 2012 - London: Continuum.
    Since the 2004 publication of his book The Good in the Right, Robert Audi has been at the forefront of the current resurgence of interest in intuitionism – the idea that human beings have an intuitive sense of right and wrong – in ethics. The New Intuitionism brings together some of the world’s most important contemporary writers from such diverse fields as metaethics, epistemology and moral psychology to explore the latest implications of, and challenges to, Audi’s work. The book also (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Moral Epistemology.Aaron Zachary Zimmerman - 2010 - Routledge.
    How do we know right from wrong? Do we even have moral knowledge? Moral epistemology studies these and related questions about our understanding of virtue and vice. It is one of philosophy’s perennial problems, reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume and Kant, and has recently been the subject of intense debate as a result of findings in developmental and social psychology. Throughout the book Zimmerman argues that our belief in moral knowledge can survive sceptical challenges. He also draws (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   506 citations  
  • The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross - 1930 - Clarendon Press.
    The Right and the Good, a classic of twentieth-century philosophy by the eminent scholar Sir David Ross, is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton-Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and Stratton-Lake provides the context for a proper understanding of Ross's great (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   430 citations  
  • Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   510 citations  
  • The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics.Gilbert Harman - 1977 - Oxford University Press.
    Contains an overall account of morality in its philosophical format particularly with regard to problems of observation, evidence, and truth.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  • Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   587 citations  
  • The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Robert Audi - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a unified collection of published and unpublished papers by Robert Audi, a renowned defender of the rationalist position in ethics. Taken together, the essays present a vigorous, broadly-based argument in moral epistemology and a related account of reasons for action and their bearing on moral justification and moral character. Part I details Audi's compelling moral epistemology while Part II offers a unique vision of ethical concepts and an account of moral explanation, as well as a powerful model (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • The Authority of Memory.David Owens - 1999 - European Journal of Philosophy 7 (3):312-29.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS] Nothing is more common than for us to continue to believe without rehearsing the reasons which led us to believe in the first place. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Were we obliged constantly to re-trace our cognitive steps, to reassure ourselves that we are entitled to our convictions, how could we ever move forward? We have probably forgotten why we adopted many of our current beliefs and even if we could dredge the evidence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
    Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   667 citations  
  • Moral Perception.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):159-175.
    : In this paper, I defend the view that we can have perceptual moral knowledge. First, I motivate the moral perception view by drawing on some examples involving perceptual knowledge of complex non‐moral properties. I argue that we have little reason to think that perception of moral properties couldn't operate in much the same way that our perception of these complex non‐moral properties operates. I then defend the moral perception view from two challenging objections that have yet to be adequately (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
    This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism.Fiona Macpherson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):24-62.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged cases. The case (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   196 citations  
  • Moral Perception and the Causal Objection.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Ratio 23 (3):291-307.
    One of the primary motivations behind moral anti-realism is a deep-rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification.Susanna Siegel - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2).
    In this paper I argue that it's possible that the contents of some visual experiences are influenced by the subject's prior beliefs, hopes, suspicions, desires, fears or other mental states, and that this possibility places constraints on the theory of perceptual justification that 'dogmatism' or 'phenomenal conservativism' cannot respect.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   184 citations  
  • Moral Perception.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey.Thomas D. Senor - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):199–208.
  • Conscious Reference.Alva Noë - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):470-482.
    The world shows up to perceptual consciousness in virtue of the deployment of distinct sensorimotor and also conceptual skills. The availability of the world to thought is, in contrast, to be explained in connection with the different sorts of skills put to work in thought. I show that thought and experience are varieties of skilful access to the world. The aim of the paper is to present the outlines of a general theory of access.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The Visual Experience of Causation.Susanna Siegel - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):519-540.
    In this paper I argue that causal relations between objects are represented in visual experience, and contrast my argument and its conclusion with Michotte's results from the 1960's.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • A Limited Defense of Moral Perception.Justin P. McBrayer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
    One popular reason for rejecting moral realism is the lack of a plausible epistemology that explains how we come to know moral facts. Recently, a number of philosophers have insisted that it is possible to have moral knowledge in a very straightforward way—by perception. However, there is a significant objection to the possibility of moral perception: it does not seem that we could have a perceptual experience that represents a moral property, but a necessary condition for coming to know that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Pleasure and Reflection in Ross's Intuitionism.Philip Stratton-Lake - 2002 - In Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press. pp. 113-36.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Analyticity Reconsidered.Paul Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   193 citations  
  • Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?H. A. Prichard - 1912 - Mind 21 (81):21-37.
    Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  • The Right and the Good.W. D. Ross - 1932 - The Monist 42:157.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   260 citations  
  • The Nature of Morality.D. Z. Phillips & Gilbert Harman - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (110):89.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   242 citations  
  • II—Jonathan Dancy: Moral Perception.Jonathan Dancy - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):99-117.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   519 citations  
  • The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):697-722.
    In this paper I offer a theory of what makes certain influences on visual experiences by prior mental states (including desires, beliefs, moods, and fears) reduce the justificatory force of those experiences. The main idea is that experiences, like beliefs, can have rationally assessable etiologies, and when those etiologies are irrational, the experiences are epistemically downgraded.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • Is Vision Continuous with Cognition?: The Case for Cognitive Impenetrability of Visual Perception.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):341-365.
    Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to general cognition. This paper sets out some of the arguments for both sides and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, which may be called early vision or just vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge and utilities - in other words it (...)
    Direct download (20 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • I—Robert Audi: Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge.Robert Audi - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Ii—Moral Perception.Jonathan Dancy - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):99-117.
    I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Good in the Right.Robert Audi - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):250-261.