This text explores the ethical significance of identity, including our gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and sexuality, for our obligations to others and to ourselves.

This article presents a unifying interpretation of Rawls’s major works. The interpretation emphasizes the parallels in Rawls’s theories of justice and legitimacy for domestic and global institutions.

David Miller is right that weak cosmopolitanism is undistinctive and strong cosmopolitanism implausibly curtails associative duties. But there are intermediate views that avoid both of these problems. One such view holds that compatriotism makes no difference to our most important negative duties and that among these is the duty not to impose unjust social institutions upon other human beings. On this view, our duty not to impose an unjust institutional order on foreigners is exactly as stringent as our duty not (...) to impose an unjust institutional order upon our compatriots. This view is not trivial; it has important consequences for our moral responsibilities in the world as it is. And it is compatible with associative duties insofar as these increase what we owe to some without decreasing what we owe to persons at large. (shrink)

Many liberals have argued that a cosmopolitan perspective on global justice follows from the basic liberal principles of justice. Yet, increasingly, it is also said that intrinsic to liberalism is a doctrine of nationalism. This raises a potential problem for the liberal defense of cosmopolitan justice as it is commonly believed that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are conflicting ideals. If this is correct, there appears to be a serious tension within liberal philosophy itself, between its cosmopolitan aspiration on the one hand, (...) and its nationalist agenda on the other. I argue, however, that this alleged conflict between liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan liberalism disappears once we get clear on the scope and goals of cosmopolitan justice and the parameters of liberal nationalism. Liberal nationalism and cosmopolitan global justice, properly understood, are mutually compatible ideals. (shrink)

ABSTRACTMore than a third of the world's population has no access to essential drugs. More than half of this group of people live in the poorest regions of Africa and Asia. Several factors determine the accessibility of drugs in developing countries. Hardly any medicines for tropical diseases are being developed, but even existing drugs are often not available to the patients who need them.One of the important determinants of access to drugs is the working of the patent system. This paper (...) first maps out some facts about the global patent regime that has emerged as a consequence of the conclusion of the WTO‐TRIPs Agreement in 1994. Attempts to construct a moral justification of the patent system have been based on three grounds: natural rights, distributive justice, and utilitarian arguments. This paper examines to what extent and on which grounds drug patents can be justified. The final section looks at the so‐called ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health’, which was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference two years ago, recognising the primacy of public health over the interests of patent proprietors. (shrink)

More than a third of the world's population has no access to essential drugs. More than half of this group of people live in the poorest regions of Africa and Asia. Several factors determine the accessibility of drugs in developing countries. Hardly any medicines for tropical diseases are being developed, but even existing drugs are often not available to the patients who need them.One of the important determinants of access to drugs is the working of the patent system. This paper (...) first maps out some facts about the global patent regime that has emerged as a consequence of the conclusion of the WTO‐TRIPs Agreement in 1994. Attempts to construct a moral justification of the patent system have been based on three grounds: natural rights, distributive justice, and utilitarian arguments. This paper examines to what extent and on which grounds drug patents can be justified. The final section looks at the so‐called ‘Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health’, which was adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference two years ago, recognising the primacy of public health over the interests of patent proprietors. (shrink)

This paper examines the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which is one of the World Trade Organisations free trade agreements. In particular, I examine the extent to which the GATS unduly restricts the scope for national democratic choice. For purposes of illustration, I focus on the domestic health system as the subject of policy choice. I argue that signatories to the GATS effectively acquire a constitutional obligation to maintain a domestic health sector with a certain minimum degree of (...) privatisation. Like constitutional obligations, the restrictions the GATS imposes on the freedom of future generations to structure their domestic health sector are (i) very difficult, though not strictly impossible, to alter; and (ii) not chosen in any ordinary sense by the subject generation. To gain democratic legitimacy, therefore, the relevant provisions of the GATS must pass some higher standard of democratic scrutiny, such as ratification by a super-majority. Ordinary legislative ratification does not suffice. (shrink)

In this article, the last in the symposium on world poverty and human rights, Pogge replies to his critics Mathias Risse, Alan Patten, Rowan Cruft, Norbert Anwander, and Debra Satz.

I want, some might say, to have my cake and eat it too for I want to be both a cosmopolitan and a nationalist, and, congruently with that, I think liberals and socialists, depending on the societies in which they live, should be either cosmopolitan nationalists or people in sympathy with liberal nationalist projects where these projects have a legitimate point. This includes people like myself who are liberal socialists committed, as all socialists are, to socialist internationalism and the international (...) solidarity that goes with it. How can—or can?—these things consistently go together? Beyond that—consistency being necessary but hardly a sufficient condition for adequacy—why go for cosmopolitan nationalism? Why not instead just go straight-out for cosmopolitanism and its internationalist outlook without the dangler 'nationalism'? (shrink)

This article attacks the view that global justice should be understood in terms of a global principle of equality. The principle mainly discussed is global equality of opportunity – the idea that people of similar talent and motivation should have equivalent opportunity sets no matter to which society they belong. I argue first that in a culturally plural world we have no neutral way of measuring opportunity sets. I then suggest that the most commonly offered defences of global egalitarianism – (...) the cosmopolitan claim that human lives have equal value, the argument that a persons nationality is a morally arbitrary characteristic, and the more empirical claim that relationships among fellow-nationals are no longer special in a way that matters for justice – are all defective. If we fall back on the idea of equality as a default principle, then we have to recognize that pursuing global equality of opportunity systematically would leave no space for national self-determination. Finally, I ask whether global inequality might be objectionable for reasons independent of justice, and argue that the main reason for concern is the inequalities of power that are likely to emerge in a radically unequal world. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is not a single encompassing idea but rather comes in at least six different varieties, which have often been conflated in previous literature. This is shown on the basis of the discussion in late eighteenth-century Germany (roughly, 1780-1800). The six varieties are: (1) moral cosmopolitanism, the view that all humans belong to a single moral community; political cosmopolitanism, which advocates (2) reform of the international political and legal order or (3) a strong notion of human rights; (4) cultural cosmopolitanism, (...) which emphasizes the value of global cultural pluralism; (5) economic cosmopolitanism, which aims at establishing a global free market; and (6) the romantic ideal of humanity as united by faith and love. These six kinds of cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive, and the relationships among them are clarified. (shrink)

Dans cet essai, je tente de répondre à quelques-unes des objections habituellement adressées au cosmopolitisme, en prenant en considération la perspective de ceux que cette doctrine risque d’affecter, à savoir, les immigrants. J’argue que certaines de ces objections se fondent sur des conceptions simplifiées à l’excès et empiriquement inexactes de ce que sont la communauté et l’identité culturelle. J’examine aussi en détail la controverse entourant les possibles implications autoritaristes — ou impérialistes — des propositions visant à faire d’un système moral-légal (...) un modèle pour le monde. L’objectif général de cet article est d’explorer les conditions permettant l’établissement d’une règle de justice cosmopolitique, dans un contexte mondial marqué par des différences culturelles et une extrême inégalité dans l’accès aux ressources et au pouvoir décisionnel. Certaines questions relatives à la motivation morale sont aussi abordées. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism, originally a doctrine of world citizenship, has come in recent political philosophy to mean simply an ethical outlook in which every human being is equally an object of moral concern. However ethical cosmopolitans slide from this moral truism to deny, controversially, that as agents we have special duties of limited scope. Political communities create relations of reciprocity between their citizens and pursue projects that reflect culturally specific values and beliefs, generating special duties among fellow-members. Strong cosmopolitanism would require the (...) creation of a world government, and this could only be an imperialist project in which existing cultural differences were either nullified or privatised. (shrink)

Democracy is the very rationale for many nationalist movements aspiring to form a state of their own. In their view, political sovereignty is a necessary condition for a people to secure in its own culture, language and traditions, first, to control its internal affairs and second, to gain a voice in the concert of nations. The latter is increasingly important, so goes the argument, in a context in which the shaping of a new global world order is at issue. The (...) same argument is currently made by citizens of existing liberal countries who urge their state to keep, within new economic or political larger unions, the control of the national economy, culture and institutions. (shrink)

Democracy is the very rationale for many nationalist movements aspiring to form a state of their own. In their view, political sovereignty is a necessary condition for a people to secure in its own culture, language and traditions, first, to control its internal affairs and second, to gain a voice in the concert of nations. The latter is increasingly important, so goes the argument, in a context in which the shaping of a new global world order is at issue. The (...) same argument is currently made by citizens of existing liberal countries who urge their state to keep, within new economic or political larger unions, the control of the national economy, culture and institutions. (shrink)

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia is in large measure an ingenious elaboration of an argument for capitalism adumbrated by Plekhanov. The capitalism Nozick advocates is more pure than the one we know today. It lacks taxation for social welfare, and it permits degrees of inequality far greater than most apologists for contemporary bourgeois society would countenance. The present paper paper is only indirectly a critique of Nozick's defense of capitalism. Its immediate aim is to refute Nozick's major argument against (...) a rival of capitalism, socialism. The refutation vindicates socialism against that argument, but no one opposed to socialism on other grounds should expect to be converted by this paper. (shrink)

This paper considers normative questions about the integration of legally resident immigrants into contemporary liberal democratic states. First, I ask to what extent immigrants should enjoy the same rights as citizens and on what terms they should have access to citizenship itself. I defend two general principles: (1) differential treatment requires justi.cation; (2) the longer immigrants have lived in the receiving society, the stronger their claim to equal rights and eventually to full citizenship. Second, I explore additional forms of economic, (...) cultural, social, and political integration. I argue that the integration of immigrants depends upon a process of mutual, but asymmetrical adaptation and that it is precisely because the immigrants have to adapt more that the receiving society bears a greater responsibility to take steps to promote equality between the immigrants and the existing population. (shrink)

Philosophical attention to problems about global justice is flourishing in a way it has not in any time in memory. This paper considers some reasons for the rise of interest in the subject and reflects on some dilemmas about the meaning of the idea of the cosmopolitan in reasoning about social institutions, concentrating on the two principal dimensions of global justice, the economic and the political.

Since its publication in 1965 _Political Argument_ has come to be recognized as occupying a key position in the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy. A number of the ideas introduced by Barry have become part of the standard vocabulary, such as the distinction between ideal-regarding and want-regarding principles and the division of principles into aggregative and distributive. _Political Argument_ provided the first precise analysis, still frequently cited, of the conception that political values have trade-off relations; the analysis of the notion (...) of the public interest has also enjoyed wide influence. For this long-awaited reprint, the author has prepared a substantial, new introductory essay in which he recounts the process of writing the book and sets it in the intellectual milieu of its time. He then offers extensive comments on the subsequent fate of some of the leading ideas and assesses the book in light of criticisms and later developments. Finally, Barry evaluates current approaches to political philosophy as they look today. This new edition of _Political Argument_ will interest political theorists, philosophers, economists, and a range of other scholars. Brilliant and incisive, it will engender discussion and debate from many quarters. (shrink)

This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within a shared national public (...) culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts. (shrink)