Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals’s Chapter XI on imagination is central to the book. It is physically located in the middle and considers a central faculty, or central faculties, in Murdoch’s philosophy: imagination and fantasy. The chapter begins with in-depth, original discussions of Immanuel Kant and Plato’s understanding of imagination. These discussions are not easy to follow. One of my aims here is to reconstruct Murdoch’s argument through close text reading, explaining some of the terminology and adding missing elements. (...) Another aim is to relate the remaining sections of this chapter to the earlier discussion of Kant and Plato. However, I begin by briefly exploring my own reading experience of MGM and suggesting some solutions to the difficulties experienced when reading the work. (shrink)

To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something (...) to be the case. // -/- Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, and has been explored from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. Philosophers of mind have examined imagination’s role in mindreading and in pretense. Philosophical aestheticians have examined imagination’s role in creating and in engaging with different types of artworks. Epistemologists have examined imagination’s role in theoretical thought experiments and in practical decision-making. Philosophers of language have examined imagination’s role in irony and metaphor. // -/- Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions of imagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. (shrink)

It is not unusual for even the very greatest polemics to proceed through some unfairness toward what they attack, indeed to draw strength from the very distortions which they impose upon their targets. In the same way that a good caricature of a person’s face enables us to see something that we feel was genuinely there to be seen all along, a conviction that persists in the face of, and may indeed be sustained by, our ongoing sense of the discrepancy (...) between the picture and the reality. Some such distortion may be necessary in order to point to or make visible a feature that is perfectly present, but is obscured by the mass of other details. In the case of ideas and systems of thought there is an additional reason for a positive concern with distortion, and that is that we do not encounter ideas in a social or intellectual void. Rather, they come to us through their admirers, detractors, followers and opponents. The social and intellectual reception and dissemination of Plato, or Marx, or the Bible are now and forever part of the meaning of those texts, and this remains true however demonstrable it may be that their reception involves a large distortion of what is actually there in those texts. To concern oneself with them must also be to concern oneself with what both their advocates and opponents have made of them, and in this or that context this image may be of greater social and intellectual importance than the question of strictly ‘correct’ readings. And of course for no contemporary school of philosophy has the social and cultural milieu of its reception been more important to its identity as a trend of thought than in the case of Existentialism, particularly in its French, Sartrean form. Today, of course, it has been a fact of intellectual life within the Academy for over 30 years that Existentialism has no friends, and is.. (shrink)

Despite Kierkegaard's continual awareness of the dangers of the imagination, he nevertheless redeems the imagination by placing it at the heart of the ethical and religious life. The aim of this paper is to focus on the shape of these positive ways of "being imaginative" in the ethical sphere--aspects which in large part continue in the higher religious stages. Judge William's somewhat obscure discussion of the "actual self" and "ideal self" in "Either/Or", Vol. II, is the clue to how a (...) person's imaginative capacities are harnessed in subjectivity. To illuminate this, the paper examines the imagination's relation to choice, the manner in which the imagination opens the "inner infinity" of the ethical, the imagination's relation to kinesis, and its complex character as the expression for both possibility and the concrete in personality as unified in a dynamic ethical repetition which gives transparency and continuity to the self. Given these new roles for the imagination, Kierkegaard is able to transcend both Romantic and Idealist notions of the "individual," and importantly modifies Hegel's concept of the self, which outwardly appears so similar to Kierkegaard's. In effect, Kierkegaard redeems the imagination by the ethical, and redeems the ethical by means of the imagination. The imagination emerges as a complex and rich ethical concept, for the imagination is a medium of possibility, an activity of idealizing, a passion which contributes to resolution, an organ for the concrete, and a disposition. The paper concludes with a brief sketch of how, in Kierkegaard's understanding, the religious and especially Christian forms of existence continue, yet crucially alter, this imagination of repetition. (shrink)

The most distinctive feature of Murdoch's philosophical project is her attempt to reclaim the exploration of moral life as a legitimate topic of philosophical investigation. In contrast to the predominant focus on action and decision, she argues that “what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” (AD 293).1 I shall argue that to (...) fully appreciate the novelty of this proposal we need to recognize some elements of continuity with analytic methods of philosophical inquiry and themes that belong to continental traditions. On Murdoch's view, the most important question facing moral philosophy is that of whether and how we can become better. In order to describe moral progress and failure, struggle and ascent, we need ethical concepts capable of capturing mental events such as change in mind, self-examination, and redescription. These concepts are presently unavailable, and this lack seriously undermines our attempts to understand the phenomena of morality. Because of this conceptual loss, we succumb to the mistaken idea that moral life coincides with its scattered outer manifestations, i.e. public acts. Instead, Murdoch urges us “the moral life […] is something that goes on continually, not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices” (SG 37).2 Murdoch's point is that we need to conceive the locus of agency more broadly if we want to understand the complicated machinery of action. But perhaps more importantly, she points out that we may be morally active while entertaining a contemplative attitude, which does not issue in action. The grain of moral life, she argues, is constituted by the.. (shrink)