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Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephan Hartmann.details
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Anselm on Freedom.Katherin Rogers - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Tools of Metaphysics and the Metaphysics of Science.Theodore Sider - 2020 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Explanatory Priority and the Counterfactuals of Freedom.Wes Morriston - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):21-35.details
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Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.details
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Explanatory priority monism.Isaac Wilhelm - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1339-1359.details
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Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.details
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Making Time Stand Still: A Response to Sober’s Counter-Example to the Principle of the Common Cause.Daniel Steel - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):309-317.details
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Venetian sea levels, british bread prices, and the principle of the common cause.Elliott Sober - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):331-346.details
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Is There Freedom In Heaven?James F. Sennett - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):69-82.details
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Grounding in the image of causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.details
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Anselm on freedom.Katherin A. Rogers - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Recent Work on Molinism.Ken Perszyk - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.details
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Molinism and compatibilism.Kenneth J. Perszyk - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):11-33.details
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Free will.Derk Pereboom - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?Kenneth L. Pearce - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):158-180.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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Transitivity, self-explanation, and the explanatory circularity argument against Humean accounts of natural law.Marc Lange - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1337-1353.details
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The Possibility of an All-Knowing God.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1986 - London: Macmillan Press.details
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The Possibility of an All-Knowing God.William Hasker & Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):125.details
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Middle Knowledge.William Hasker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (2):223-236.details
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Middle Knowledge.William Hasker - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (2):223-236.details
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God, Time, and Knowledge.William Hasker - 1989 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
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Explanatory priority: Transitive and unequivocal, a reply to William Craig.William Hasker - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):389-393.details
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A refutation of middle knowledge.William Hasker - 1986 - Noûs 20 (4):545-557.details
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Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!William Hasker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.details
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Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets: Structure and Evidence Sensitivity.Patrick Grim, Frank Seidl, Calum McNamara, Hinton E. Rago, Isabell N. Astor, Caroline Diaso & Peter Ryner - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):42-69.details
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Counterfactual scorekeeping.Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Divine providence.Thomas P. Flint - 1998 - In Thomas P. Flint & Michael Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Ithaca: Oxford University Press.details
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The truth about tracing.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):531-556.details
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Toward a plausible event-causal indeterminist account of free will.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):127-144.details
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Robert Adams’s New Anti-Molinist Argument.William Lane Craig - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):857-861.details
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On Hasker’s Defense of Anti-Molinism.William Lane Craig - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (2):236-240.details
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How Explanation Guides Confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):359-68.details
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Toward a credible agent–causal account of free will.Randolph Clarke - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):191-203.details
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Summary.By Karen Bennett - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):287-289.details
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An anti-molinist argument.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.details
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Causality.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Evidence and Inductive Inference.Nevin Climenhaga - 2023 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge. pp. 435-449.details
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Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Free Will.Derk Pereboom (ed.) - 2009 - Hackett Publishing Company.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free Will: A Philosophical Study.Laura Waddell Ekstrom - 1999 - Boulder, Colo.: Westview.details
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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Randolph Clarke - 2003 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory (American Philosophical Quarterly Monographs 2). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.details
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