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  1. Depersonalization: A Selective Impairment of Self-Awareness.Mauricio Sierra & Anthony S. David - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):99-108.
    Depersonalization is characterised by a profound disruption of self-awareness mainly characterised by feelings of disembodiment and subjective emotional numbing.It has been proposed that depersonalization is caused by a fronto-limbic suppressive mechanism – presumably mediated via attention – which manifests subjectively as emotional numbing, and disables the process by which perception and cognition normally become emotionally coloured, giving rise to a subjective feeling of ‘unreality’.Our functional neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies support the above model and indicate that, compared with normal and clinical (...)
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  • Emotional Experience and Awareness of Self: Functional MRI Studies of Depersonalization Disorder.Nick Medford, Mauricio Sierra, Argyris Stringaris, Vincent Giampietro, Michael J. Brammer & Anthony S. David - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
  • I Overthink—Therefore I Am Not: An Active Inference Account of Altered Sense of Self and Agency in Depersonalisation Disorder.Anna Ciaunica, Anil Seth, Jakub Limanowski, Casper Hesp & Karl J. Friston - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103320.
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  • Exploring phenomenological interviews: questions, lessons learned and perspectives.Svetlana Sholokhova, Valeria Bizzari & Thomas Fuchs - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):1-7.
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  • Making Sense of the Cotard Syndrome: Insights From the Study of Depersonalisation.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (3):356-391.
    Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...)
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  • Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding.Philip Gerrans - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):401-418.
    A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through the (...)
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  • Whatever Next and Close to My Self—The Transparent Senses and the “Second Skin”: Implications for the Case of Depersonalization.Anna Ciaunica, Andreas Roepstorff, Aikaterini Katerina Fotopoulou & Bruna Petreca - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.
    In his paper “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science,” Andy Clark seminally proposed that the brain's job is to predict whatever information is coming “next” on the basis of prior inputs and experiences. Perception fundamentally subserves survival and self-preservation in biological agents, such as humans. Survival however crucially depends on rapid and accurate information processing of what is happening in the here and now. Hence, the term “next” in Clark's seminal formulation must include not (...)
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  • Emotion and the Unreal Self: Depersonalization Disorder and De-Affectualization.Nick Medford - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):139-144.
    Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is a psychiatric condition in which there is a pervasive change in the quality of subjective experience, in the absence of psychosis. The core complaint is a persistent and disturbing feeling that experience of oneself and the world has become empty, lifeless, and not fully real. A greatly reduced emotional responsivity, or “de-affectualization,” is frequently described. This article examines the phenomenology and neurobiology of DPD with a particular emphasis on the emotional aspects. It is argued that the (...)
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  • The Refutation of Idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.
  • The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
  • Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self.Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas - 2003 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.
    In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin (...)
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  • The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
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  • Schizophrenia in the World: Arguments for a Contextual Phenomenology of Psychopathology.Elizabeth Pienkos - 2020 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 51 (2):184-206.
    Traditionally, phenomenological theories of schizophrenia have emphasized disturbances in self-experience, with relatively little acknowledgement of the surrounding world. However, epidemiological research consistently demonstrates a strong relationship between traumatic and stressful life events and the development of schizophrenia, suggesting that encounters in the world are highly relevant for many people diagnosed with this disorder. This paper reviews foundational texts in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology on the nature of subjectivity and its disturbances, finding support for broadening contemporary phenomenological models of schizophrenia to (...)
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  • Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account.Philip Gerrans - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  • Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation.George Deane, Mark Miller & Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
  • ‘Seeing the Dark’: Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference.Jakub Limanowski & Karl Friston - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood.Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.
  • The Phenomenology of Anomalous World Experience in Schizophrenia: A Qualitative Study.Elizabeth Pienkos, Steven Silverstein & Louis Sass - 2017 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 48 (2):188-213.
    This current study is a pilot project designed to clarify changes in the lived world among people with diagnoses within the schizophrenia spectrum. The Examination of Anomalous World Experience was used to interview ten participants with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and a comparison group of three participants with major depressive disorder. Interviews were analyzed using the descriptive phenomenological method. This analysis revealed two complementary forms of experience unique toszparticipants: Destabilization, the experience that reality and the intersubjective world are less comprehensible, less (...)
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  • Anomalous Self-Experience in Depersonalization and Schizophrenia: A Comparative Investigation.Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos, Barnaby Nelson & Nick Medford - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):430-441.
    Various forms of anomalous self-experience can be seen as central to schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. We examined similarities and differences between anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, as listed in the EASE , and those described in published accounts of severe depersonalization. Our aims were to consider anomalous self-experience in schizophrenia in a comparative context, to refine and enlarge upon existing descriptions of experiential disturbances in depersonalization, and to explore hypotheses concerning a possible core process in schizophrenia . Numerous (...)
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  • Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  • Faces of Intersubjectivity.Louis Sass & Elizabeth Pienkos - 2015 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (1):1-32.
    Here we consider interpersonal experience in schizophrenia, melancholia, and mania. Our goal is to improve understanding of similarities and differences in how other people can be experienced in these disorders, through a review of first-person accounts and case examples and of contemporary and classic literature on the phenomenology of these disorders. We adopt a tripartite/dialectical structure: first we explore main differences as traditionally described; next we consider how the disorders may resemble each other; finally we discuss more subtle but perhaps (...)
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  • The Depersonalized Brain: New Evidence Supporting a Distinction Between Depersonalization and Derealization From Discrete Patterns of Autonomic Suppression Observed in a Non-Clinical Sample.Hayley Dewe, Derrick G. Watson, Klaus Kessler & Jason J. Braithwaite - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 63:29-46.
  • Implicit and Explicit Temporality.Thomas Fuchs - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (3):195-198.
  • Mineness First: Three Challenges to Contemporary Theories of Bodily Self-Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - In Adrian J. T. Alsmith & Frédérique de Vignemont (eds.), The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Boston, USA: MIT Press. pp. 189-216.
    Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  • Phénoménologie de la Perception.M. Merleau-Ponty - 1949 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 5 (4):466-466.
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