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Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities.Peter Walley - 1991 - Chapman & Hall.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.details
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Decision making with imprecise probabilities.Brian Weatherson - 1998details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
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Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.details
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The Enterprise of Knowledge, An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chances.Henry E. Kyburg - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):347-354.details
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The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.details
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On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
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On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.details
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Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Rationality and indeterminate probabilities.Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):33-48.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
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Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence.Jason Konek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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