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Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 296, ISBN-13:9780199251315. £35.00. [REVIEW]Chris Alen Sula - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):227-228.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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