Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values.John Broome - 2001 - In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98--120.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   784 citations  
  • Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
    Part I: The representation of life -- Can life be given a real definition? -- The representation of the living individual -- The representation of the life-form itself -- Part II: Naive action theory -- Types of practical explanation -- Naive explanation of action -- Action and time -- Part III: Practical generality -- Two tendencies in practical philosophy -- Practices and dispositions as sources of the goodness of individual actions -- Practice and disposition as sources of individual action.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   297 citations  
  • Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action.Maria Alvarez - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Understanding human beings and their distinctive rational and volitional capacities requires a clear account of such things as reasons, desires, emotions, and motives, and how they combine to produce and explain human behaviour. Maria Alvarez presents a fresh and incisive study of these concepts, centred on reasons and their role in human agency.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   169 citations  
  • Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • The Varieties of Self-Knowledge.Annalisa Coliva - 2016 - London: Palgrave.
    This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Intentionality of Intention and Action.John R. Searle - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
    This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Normative Practical Reasoning.Christian Piller - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175 - 216.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Normative Practical Reasoning: John Broome.John Broome - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):175–193.
    Practical reasoning is a process of reasoning that concludes in an intention. One example is reasoning from intending an end to intending what you believe is a necessary means: 'I will leave the next buoy to port; in order to do that I must tack; so I'll tack', where the first and third sentences express intentions and the second sentence a belief. This sort of practical reasoning is supported by a valid logical derivation, and therefore seems uncontrovertible. A more contentious (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • What is the Content of an Intention in Action?John McDowell - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):415-432.
    On the view proposed, the content of an intention in action is given by what one would say in expressing it, and the proper form for expressing such an intention is a statement about what one is doing: e.g. ‘I am doing such-and-such’. By contrast, some think that there are normative or evaluative elements to the content of an intention in action which would be left out of a form that merely stated facts. They think that the appropriate way to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   558 citations  
  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1009 citations  
  • Must There Be Basic Action?Douglas Lavin - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):273-301.
    The idea of basic action is a fixed point in the contemporary investigation of the nature of action. And while there are arguments aimed at putting the idea in place, it is meant to be closer to a gift of common sense than to a hard-won achievement of philosophical reflection. It first appears at the stage of innocuous description and before the announcement of philosophical positions. And yet, as any decent magician knows, the real work so often gets done in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Acting on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-181.
    'Knowledge and its Limits' starts its exposition of the knowledge-first approach to epistemology with a structural analogy between knowledge and action as the two key relations between mind and world (Williamson 2000: 1, 6-8). This chapter aims to reconsider the relation between knowledge and action, and refine the analogy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • The Language of Thought Hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A comprehensive introduction to the Language of Though Hypothesis (LOTH) accessible to general audiences. LOTH is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Can I Only Intend My Own Actions?Luca Ferrero - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Action and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. (1) 70-94.
    In this paper, I argue against the popular philosophical thesis---aka the ‘own action condition’---that an agent can only intend one’s own actions. I argue that the own action condition does not hold for any executive attitude, intentions included. The proper object of intentions is propositional rather than agential (‘I intend that so-and-so be the case’ rather than ‘I intend to do such-and-such’). I show that, although there are some essential de se components in intending, they do not restrict the content (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Action as Conclusion.Philip Clark - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):481-505.
    On the question of the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning, few have been willing to follow Aristotle's lead. He said the conclusion was an action. These days, the conclusion is usually described either as a proposition about what one ought to do, or as a psychological state or event, such as a decision to do something, an intention to do something, or a belief about what one ought to do. Why favor these options over the action-as-conclusion view? By (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Act and Intent.Annette C. Baier - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):648-658.
  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   835 citations  
  • The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):457-488.
    Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account of the distinction (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Choice and Action in Aristotle.A. W. Price - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):435-462.
    There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ, or that I φ? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice. I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish, has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Action as Conclusion.Philip Clark - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):481-505.
    On the question of the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning, few have been willing to follow Aristotle's lead. He said the conclusion was an action. These days, the conclusion is usually described either as a proposition about what one ought to do, or as a psychological state or event, such as a decision to do something, an intention to do something, or a belief about what one ought to do. Why favor these options over the action-as-conclusion view? By (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1005 citations  
  • Action, Content and Inference.Jonathan Dancy - unknown
  • Anaphora and Attitudes de Se.Gennaro Chierchia - 1989 - In Renate Bartsch, J. F. A. K. van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (eds.), Semantics and Contextual Expression. Foris Publications. pp. 11--1.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • The Intentionality of Intention and Action.J. Searle - 1981 - Cognitive Science 4 (1):47-70.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Frege's Theory of Predication: An Elaboration and Defense, with Some New Applications.Ian Rumfitt - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):599-637.
  • Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   655 citations  
  • Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.). Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
  • Practical Reflection.Michael H. Robins - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Intending, Knowing How, Infinitives.Jennifer Hornsby - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):1-17.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   417 citations  
  • Practical Reflection.Dudley Knowles - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):524-527.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Counterfactuals. [REVIEW]William Parry - 1973 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):278-281.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   463 citations  
  • Objects of Intention.Bruce Vermazen - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (3):223 - 265.
  • Intentionality.J. R. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   565 citations  
  • Knowledge How in Philosophy of Action.Jennifer Hornsby - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:87-104.
    I maintain that an account of knowledge how to do something – an account which might be supposed to uncover ‘the nature’ of such knowledge – can't be got by considering what linguists tell us is expressed in ascriptions of knowing how. Attention must be paid to the knowledge that is actually being exercised when someone is doing something. I criticize some claims about ascriptions of knowledge-how which derive from contemporary syntactic and semantic theory. I argue that these claims can (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reasoning in Stages.Nishi Shah & Matthew Silverstein - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):101-113.
    Mark Schroeder has recently presented apparent counterexamples to the standard account of the distinction between the right and the wrong kinds of reasons. We argue that these examples appear to refute the standard account only because they blur the distinction between two kinds of reasoning: reasoning about whether to intend or believe that p and reasoning about whether to take up the question of whether to intend or believe that p.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Propositional Attitudes.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-523.
    Some philosophers hold that philosophy is what you do to a problem until it’s clear enough to solve it by doing science. Others hold that if a philosophical problem succumbs to empirical methods, that shows it wasn’t really philosophical to begin with. Either way, the facts seem clear enough: questions first mooted by philosophers are sometimes coopted by people who do experiments. This seems to be happening now to the question: “what are propositional attitudes?” and cognitive psychology is the science (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Intention and Uncertainty.H. P. Grice - 1971 - Proceedings of the British Academy 57:263-279.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  • Intentions and Intending.Hector-Neri Castaneda - 1972 - American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):139 - 149.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Causal Theory of Intending.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1):43-54.
    My goal is to define intending. I defend the view that believing and desiring something are necessary for intending it. They are not sufficient, however, for some things we both expect and want (e.g., the sun to rise tomorrow) are unintendable. Restricting the objects of intention to our own future actions is unwarranted and unhelpful. Rather, the belief involved in intending must be based on the desire in a certain way. En route, I argue that expected but unwanted consequences are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Practical Reasoning.John Broome - 2002 - In José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 85--111.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations