- Ifs and cans.J. L. Austin - 1956 - In Austin J. L. (ed.), Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 42. pp. 109-132.details
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Explanatory presupposition.Elliott Sober - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):143 – 149.details
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Libertarianism, luck, and control.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):381-407.details
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Contrastive explanations: A dilemma for libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Contrastive Explanations: A Dilemma for Libertarians.Neil Levy - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (1):51-61.details
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Explanatory knowledge and metaphysical dependence.Jaegwon Kim - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:51-69.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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Torn decisions, luck, and libertarian free will: comments on Balaguer’s free will as an open scientific problem.Robert Kane - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-8.details
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The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.details
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Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.details
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On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will.Robert Kane - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):2-16.details
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On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele.Robert Kane - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121.details
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Libertarianism.Robert Kane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):35-44.details
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II—Acting ‘of One's Own Free Will’: Modern Reflections on an Ancient Philosophical Problem.Robert Kane - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):35-55.details
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Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism, and Explanatory Exclusion.Jaegwon Kim - 1988 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):225-239.details
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Contrastive explanation and the demons of determinism.Christopher Hitchcock - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):585-612.details
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Indeterminism, explanation, and luck.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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Libertarianism and Rat ionality.Richard Double - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):431-439.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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Contrastive rational explanation of free choice.Randolph Clarke - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.details
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Self-forming actions, contrastive explanations, and the structure of the will.Neil Campbell - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1225-1240.details
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Kane and Double on the Principle of Rational Explanation.Neil Campbell - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):45-63.details
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Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.details
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Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane’s Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.details
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Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.details
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Mental Causation.Fred Dretske - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2 (7):81-88.details
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Taking luck seriously.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (11):553-576.details
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Libertarianism.Robert Kane - 2007 - In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Blackwell. pp. 35 - 44.details
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Mental events as structuring causes of behavior.Fred Dretske - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Clarendon Press. pp. 121--135.details
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Misdirection on the free will problem.Richard Double - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68.details
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Free will and the dialectic of selfhood: Can one make sense of a traditional free will requiring ultimate responsibility?Robert Kane - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):25-43.details
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Replies to Fischer and Haji.Robert H. Kane - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (4):338-342.details
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