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Evil and Its Opposite

Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):113-130 (2015)

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  1. Is evil action qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing?Luke Russell - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):659 – 677.
    Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary (...)
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  • Supererogation.David Heyd - 1982 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Actions that go 'beyond the call of duty' are a common though not commonplace part of everyday life - in heroism, self-sacrifice, mercy, volunteering, or simply in small deeds of generosity and consideration. Almost universally they enjoy a high and often unique esteem and significance, and are regarded as, somehow, peculiarly good. Yet it is not easy to explain how - for if duty exhausts the moral life there is no scope to praise supererogatory acts, and if the consequentialist is (...)
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  • The nature of evil.Eve Garrard - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):43 – 60.
    We readily claim that great moral catastrophes such as the Holocaust involve evil in some way, although it' not clear what this amounts to in a secular context. This paper seeks to provide a secular account of what evil is. It examines what is intuitively the most plausible account, namely that the evil act involves the production of great suffering (or other disvalue), and argues that such outcomes are neither necessary nor sufficient for an act to be evil. Only an (...)
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  • Evil as an Explanatory Concept.Eve Garrard - 2002 - The Monist 85 (2):320-336.
    On the day on which Dr Harold Shipman, the Manchester serial killer, was convicted, there was wall-to-wall coverage of it in the media. During the course of one of the many reports, the daughter of one of his victims was interviewed, and asked for her views on why Shipman had acted as he did. What she said was this: she’d tried and tried to understand or explain his deeds, and she could only come to the conclusion that he was a (...)
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  • The suberogatory.Julia Driver - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):286 – 295.
  • Moral Saints, Moral Monsters, and the Mirror Thesis.Peter Brian Barry - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):163 - 176.
    A number of philosophers have been impressed with the thought that moral saints and moral monsters—or, evil people, to put it less sensationally—“mirror” one another, in a sense to be explained. Call this the mirror thesis. The project of this paper is to cash out the metaphorical suggestion that moral saints and evil persons mirror one other and to articulate the most plausible literal version of the mirror thesis. To anticipate, the most plausible version of the mirror thesis implies that (...)
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