Philosophical Quarterly 51:205, 512-26 (October 2001).

It is obvious that a great many of the things that we know we know because we learn them in conversation with others, conversations in which it is the intention of our interlocutor to inform us of something. It might be thought that only assertoric acts are informative. I shall argue that there is a range of conversational interventions that have this characteristic, including speech acts, presuppositions and conversational implicatures. The main focus of the paper is a discussion of the (...) different norms, both moral and epistemological, that entitle us to believe what we learn from conversations. I compare our entitlement to believe what we learn from conversation with our entitlements to believe what we learn from perception. In providing an account of our epistemic warrant for our knowledge gained in conversation with ours, I draw on the work of Tyler Burge (1993 and 1997). (shrink)

This revised edition includes a new Preface outlining developments in Relevance Theory since 1986, discussing the more serious criticisms of the theory, and ...